He advised us not to forget! - selected excerpts from Robert M. Utley's "THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FRONTIER TO THE AMERICAN MILITARY TRADITION"

These pearls of wisdom dovetail nicely with several main themes I am interested in..unremembered or misapplied traditions, organizations, doctrine or historical lessons learned - bureaucratic and institutional inertia. Robert M. Utley's evocative contribution in 1976 - a year after South Vietnam fell and as the US Army began its turn towards Air-land warfare with its All- Volunteer Army (VOLAR) force (& my commissioning year) - while not then in vogue with a military anxious to forget its immediate past - was astutely prescient given today's ongoing GWOT or long war - or whatever some current administration and their sycophants may be choosing to call it.

"...tradition must also be responsive to the “limited wars” that the nuclear specter has spawned, and these do disclose parallels with frontier warfare."

"This year’s Harmon lecturer, Robert M. Utley, ... (his) topic, “The Contribution of the Frontier to the American Military Tradition,” fitted perfectly as the keynote address for this symposium. He argued that the American military has failed to benefit from the lessons of its frontier experience, that while the frontier has provided inspiration for movie makers to create heroic images of “cavalry to the rescue,” and for reformers to create contrasting images of blue-coated troopers brutalizing innocent Indians, it has not inspired enough serious study by military strategists and tacticians. The military therefore has failed to learn from a significant episode in its past, an episode which can offer valuable insights into the problems of training and organizing conventional forces for unconventional war, into the nature of total war between irreconcilable cultures, into the myths behind the American militia tradition, and finally into the role of the military in the integration of minorities into American society." (p.1)

Selected excerpts from THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FRONTIER TO THE AMERICAN MILITARY TRADITION by Robert M. Utley (pp. 3-13), The American Military on the Frontier : the proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 30 September-1 October 1976, edited by James P. Tate, The Minerva Group, Inc., 2002

Utley:

"...I see the American military tradition as in part a record-a record as we perceive it today, not necessarily as it was in fact-of those people and events of the past that we have singled out to provide us with inspiration, edification, guidance, and even, as I have intimated, self-reproach. Besides this record, I take the American military tradition to be the accumulated body of military usage, belief, custom, and practice that has descended to us from the past. It is also policy, doctrine, thought, and institutions as they have evolved by selection, rejection, and modification through past generations to today. Let us examine how the frontier, which formed so long and prominent a part of the nation’s military history, may have contributed-or indeed may have failed to contribute - to some of these aspects of the American military tradition." (p.4)

"What we choose to remember and the way we choose to remember it may unduly flatter or unfairly condemn our military forebears, may indeed be more legend than history. Legends thus form a conspicuous part of our military tradition and are often far more influential in shaping our attitudes and beliefs than the complex, contradictory, and ambiguous truth. Our reading of truth, or at least the meaning of truth, changes from generation to generation. What is uplifting to one may be shameful to the next. We select and portray our heroes and villains to meet the needs of the present, just as we formulate doctrine, policy, practice, and other aspects of military tradition to meet the conditions of the present. The US Army’s frontier heritage, replete with stereotypes and legends as well as with genuine historical substance, has furnished a galaxy of heroes and villains. In the people and events of the military frontier we have found a major source of inspiration, guidance, pride, institutional continuity, and, not least, self-depreciation. But several centuries of Indian warfare should have contributed more to the national military tradition than a kaleidoscope of images." (p.5)

"The regular army was almost wholly a creature of the frontier. Frontier needs prompted creation of the regular army. Except for two foreign wars and one civil war, frontier needs fixed the principal mission and employment of the regular army for a century. Frontier needs dictated the periodic enlargements of the regular army in the nineteenth century.3...Citizen soldiers also contributed, though less significantly. From King Philip’s War to the Ghost Dance, colonial and state militia, territorial and national volunteers, rangers, “minute companies,” spontaneously formed home guards, and other less admirable aggregations of fighting men supplemented or altogether supplanted the regulars on the frontier. Often, indeed, the two worked at dramatic cross-purposes."
--
3. The 1st and 2nd Dragoons in 1832 and 1836. the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen in 1846. the 1st and 2nd Cavalry and 9th and 10th Infantry in 1855. The Army Act of 1866 expanded the Regular Army to meet both frontier and Reconstruction duty, but the subsequent reduction of 1869. as Reconstruction needs diminished, left a net gain of four cavalry regiments (7th to 10th) and six infantry regiments (20th to 25th) that may be attributed to frontier needs. (All mounted regiments were restyled cavalry in 1861 and the 6th Cavalry added that was a response to Civil War needs.)" (p.6)

(see my post -In search of mobility - Mounted Rangers - Dragoons - Mounted Riflemen - Voltigeurs and Foot Riflemen - Cavalry for Utley's discussion of the failure to pay the price by forming a "best fitted force for western service.")

"The contribution of the frontier to American military history was of paramount significance, but its contribution to the American military tradition was not of comparable significance. Inviting particular attention is the influence of the special conditions and requirements of the frontier on military organization, composition, strategy, and especially doctrine. A century of Indian warfare, extending a record of such conflict reaching well back into colonial times, should have taught us much about dealing with people who did not fight in conventional ways, and our military tradition might reasonably be expected to reflect the lessons thus learned. Some were not without relevance in Vietnam. In examining the role of the frontier in nineteenth century military history, however, we encounter a paradox. It is that the army’s frontier employment unfitted it for orthodox war at the same time that its preoccupation with orthodox war unfitted it for its frontier mission.(pp.6-7)

"The organization of companies and regiments seems wholly conventional in nineteenth century terms; it is difficult to see how they would have been differently organized for conventional war-and in fact they were not basically changed when conventional war came. The cavalry arm traced its beginnings to frontier needs, but the Mexican War or Civil War would surely have prompted the formation of mounted units anyway. The “rough and unsavory” rank and file that Huntington sees as well fitted for Indian fighting and road building were not well fitted for much of any duty, and the record of federalized volunteer units in the west during the Civil War plainly established the superiority of this class of troops over the typical peacetime regular. Nor, with the possible exception of the revolving pistol, a response to the frontier only insofar as mounted troops found a repeating handgun of great utility, can the evolution of military weaponry be linked to frontier needs." (p.7)

"So far as a system of border outposts constituted strategy, it was of course shaped by the frontier. But these forts represented less a deliberate plan than erratic responses to the demands of pioneer communities for security and local markets. The forts, incidentally, encouraged settlers to move beyond the range of military protection, stirred up the Indians, and led to still more forts, many beyond effective logistical support....On the operational level, strategy and tactics are clearly not a product of frontier conditions. Most army officers recognized their foe as a master of guerrilla warfare. Their writings .abound in admiring descriptions of his cunning, stealth, horsemanship, ability and endurance, skill with weapons, mobility, and exploitation of the natural habitat for military advantage. Yet the army as an institution never acted on this recognition. No military school or training program, no tactics manual, and very little professional literature provided guidance on how to fight or treat with Indians, although it should be noted in minor qualification that Dennis Hart Mahan apparently included in one of his courses at West Point a brief discussion of Indian-fighting tactics.8" (p.8)

"Lacking a formal body of doctrine for unconventional war, the army waged conventional war against the Indians. Heavy columns of infantry and cavalry, locked to slow-moving supply trains, crawled about the vast western distances in search of Indians who could scatter and vanish almost instantly. The conventional tactics of the Scott, Casey, and Upton manuals sometimes worked, by routing an adversary that had foolishly decided to stand and fight on the white man’s terms, by smashing a village whose inhabitants had grown careless, or by wearing out a quarry with persistent campaigning that made surrender preferable to constant fatigue and insecurity. But most such offensives merely broke down the grain-fed cavalry horses and ended with the troops devoting as much effort to keeping themselves supplied as to chasing Indians. The campaign of 1876 following the Custer disaster is a classic example...the army they fashioned was designed for the next conventional war rather than the present unconventional war." (p.9)

"That the army as an institution never elaborated a doctrine of Indian warfare does not mean that it contained no officers capable of breaking free of conventional thought. The most original thinker was General George Crook, who advocated reliance on mule trains as the means of achieving mobility and who saw the conquest of the Indian as dependent upon pitting Indian against Indian. Army organization provided for Indian scouts, but Crook’s concept went considerably beyond their use as guides and trailers....Had the nation’s leaders understood the lessons of General Crook’s experience, they would have recognized that the frontier army was a conventional military force trying to control, by conventional military methods, a people that did not behave like conventional enemies and, indeed, quite often were not enemies at all....Had the nation’s leaders acted on such understandings, the army might have played a more significant role in the westward movement- and one less vulnerable to criticism. An Indian auxiliary force might have been developed that could differentiate between guilty and innocent and, using the Indian’s own fighting style, contend with the guilty. Indian units were indeed developed, but never on a scale and with a continuity to permit the full effect to be demonstrated." (p.10)

"Such an Indian force would have differed from the reservation police, which in fact did remarkably well considering their limitations.13 It would have been larger, better equipped, and less influenced by the vagaries of the patronage politics that afflicted the Indian Bureau. Above all, it would have been led by a cadre of carefully chosen officers imbued with a sense of mission and experienced in Indian relations-the kind of officers artist Frederic Remington said were not so much “Indian fighters” as “Indian thinkers.”14 How different might have been the history of the westward movement had such a force been created and employed in place of the regular army line. How vastly more substantial might have been the contribution of the frontier to our traditions of unconventional warfare...By contrast, a major aspect of twentieth-century practice owes a large debt to the frontier. Total war-warring on whole enemy populations- finds ample precedent in the frontier experience." (p.11)

"..frontier precedents of total war may nevertheless be viewed as part of the historical foundation on which this feature of our military tradition rests.16"
--
16.The role of Sherman and Sheridan is discussed in my Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York, 1973), pp. 144-46."
(p.12)

"So firmly implanted was the militia tradition in the thinking of the Revolutionary generation, together with abhorrence of standing armies, that the architects of the nation conceived it as the foundation of the military system, the chief reliance for national defense as well as frontier employment. Frontier experience demonstrated how wrong they were. The Indian rout of Harmer and St. Clair so dramatically exposed the inadequacies of militia as to give birth to the regular army, a contribution of the militia to US military history of no small significance, however negative. The organized militia fell apart after 1820, as foreign threats receded, but the militia tradition, nourished in part by the Indian frontier, evolved through various mutations into the twentieth century."(p.12)

"A clear and undeniable contribution of the frontier to the national military tradition is its large role in the rise of professionalism in the army...This separation, so costly in terms of public and governmental support, had one enduring benefit. Turning inward,the army laid the groundwork for a professionalism that was to prove indispensable..." (pp.12-13)

"A final feature of our military tradition with strong frontier roots is the prominent role of minorities. The regular army’s black regiments served on the frontier for three decades following their organization in 1866 and wrote some stirring chapters of achievement. They saw harder service than the white regiments and, because they afforded continuous and honorable employment in a time when blacks found few other opportunities, boasted lower desertion rates and higher reenlistment rates. Immigrants, too, found a congenial home in the army, as well as a means of learning the English language and reaching beyond the teeming port cities of the East where so many countrymen suffered in poverty and despair. And not to be overlooked are the Indians themselves, who loyally served the white troops as scouts, auxiliaries, and finally, for a brief time in the 1890s,in units integral to the regimental organization." (p.13)

"Today the American military tradition must be responsive to the imperatives of nuclear warfare, and nuclear warfare discloses few parallels with the small-unit Indian combats of forest, plains, and desert. But the tradition must also be responsive to the “limited wars” that the nuclear specter has spawned, and these do disclose parallels with frontier warfare. It is a measure of the failure of the Indian fighting generations to understand their task that today’s doctrine does not reflect the lessons of that experience. And yet, as we have seen, the American military tradition owes a debt of noteworthy magnitude to the frontier experience." (p.13)


also available online as pdf (19 mb!) at Air Force Historical Studies Office - The American military on the frontier : the proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 30 September-1 October 1976 (out of print) Maj. James P. Tate, ed. 1978


from wikipedia:

"Robert Marshall Utley (born in 1929) is an author and historian who has written sixteen books on the history of the American West, including The Lance and the Shield: The Life of Sitting Bull. He was a former chief historian of the National Park Service. Fellow historians commend Utley as the finest historian of the American frontier in the 19th century. The Western History Association annually gives out the Robert M. Utley Book Award for the best book published on the military history of the frontier and western North America (including Mexico and Canada) from prehistory through the twentieth century...."

Selected bibliography

* Lone Star Lawmen: The Second Century of the Texas Rangers. Oxford University Press, USA (January 30, 2007).
* Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers. Oxford University Press, USA (March 22, 2002).
* A Life Wild and Perilous: Mountain Men and the Paths to the Pacific. Henry Holt & Company (1997).
* The Lance and the Shield: The Life of Sitting Bull. Henry Holt & Company (1993).
* Billy the Kid: A Short and Violent Life. University of Nebraska Press (1989).
* Cavalier in Buckskin: George Armstrong Custer and the Western Military Frontier. University of Oklahoma Press (1988).
* High Noon In Lincoln: Violence on the Western Frontier. University of New Mexico Press (1987).
* The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890. University of New Mexico Press (1983).
* Clash of Cultures: Fort Bowie and the Chiricahua Apaches. National Park Service Washington DC (1977).
* Frontier Regulars; the United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891. Macmillan, New York (1973).
* Frontiersmen in Blue; the United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865. Macmillan, New York (1967).
* The Last Days of the Sioux Nation. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT (1963).

flash forward - 2008

"In the aftermath of Vietnam, we failed to capture and integrate the most important lessons of the war into our training and education. We turned away from the bitter experiences of that time and left behind a rich body of lessons learned, especially the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to conduct successful counterinsurgency. The remarkable insights concerning the necessity and efficacy of unity of effort would never be institutionalized in doctrine or law, and the lessons of that experience would soon be lost to time and a far more insidious threat to national security, the Soviet Union."

- Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: UPSHIFTING THE ENGINE OF CHANGE, William B Caldwell IV, Steven M Leonard. Military Review. Fort Leavenworth: Jul/Aug 2008. Vol. 88, Iss. 4; pg. 6, 8 pgs

Notably, as a Background and Foundation article appearing in the Combined Arms Center Interagency edition referencing the above http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/IAReader/Interagency_TOC.pdf , is a 2001 article 'America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts, by Congressman Ike Skelton, suggesting "how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear’s battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow’s conflicts" (first appeared in Military Review 81:22-27 September-October 2001). As the Congressman rhetorically posits and rightly asserts:

"Why do I begin an article addressing tomorrow's conflicts with an account of a battle fought two and a half centuries ago? As an avid student of history, I believe it is critically important for us to understand that asymmetric warfare is not something new. In fact, it has been a recurring theme of American military history and is familiar to many of today's military officers. Many of its best historical examples come from the series of conflicts we collectively refer to as the Indian Wars."

U.S. Riflemen_1808-1821 - illustrations links

 American State Papers, Senate, 13th Congress, 2nd Session
Military Affairs: Volume 1 p.437
 
Key titles with illustrations*:

Rifleman illustration (no link)
The American War 1812–14
Philip Katcher
Illustrator: Bryan Fosten
Published by Osprey Publishing, November 1990

Riflemen illustration
The United States Army 1812-1815
By James Kochan, Illustrated by David Rickman
Published by Osprey Publishing, 2000

Riflemen illustrations (no link)
Green Coats and Glory: the United States Regiment of Riflemen, 1808-1821
By John C. Fredriksen; illustrated by Alan Archambault;
includes two illustrations from H. Charles McBarron -"Dean of American Military Illustrators"
Published by Old Fort Niagara Association, 2000

Riflemen illustration
The United States Infantry: An Illustrated History, 1775-1918
By Gregory J. W. Urwin, Illustrated by Darby Erd
Published by University of Oklahoma Press, 2000

Rifleman illustration
The United States Army 1783-1811
By James Kochan, Illustrated by David Rickman
Published by Osprey Publishing, 2001


Riflemen illustration
The American Soldier, 1814
by H. Charles McBarron, 1975, US Army Center of Military History
select Artwork-Prints and Poster Sets-The American Soldier-page 1

Riflemen illustration
copy of McBarron's -The American Soldier 1814
Fort Atkinson, Ne - The First Regiment of United States Riflemen

Riflemen illustration
American Soldier ~ 1814 (2 prints - for sale)
by H. Charles McBarron, Facsimile Signed 1975, Vintage Prints and Collectibles

*previous views of google books provided illustration - current views may have changed

Riflemen uniforms:

Riflemen illustration REGIMENT OF RIFLEMEN, WINTER UNIFORM 1812-1815 by H. Charles McBarron - Plate No. 95 - MILITARY UNIFORMS IN AMERICA VI, No. 4: December 1954, Company of Military Historians (see below)

pictures - U.S. Rifle Uniforms and Canadian Rifle Companies: An Examination of Lt. Levi Soper's Coat
by Robert Henderson - The War of 1812 website

picture - Uniform Coat - 3rd United States Rifle Regiment War of 1812-1815 depicted at The Cabildo - The Battle of New Orleans
Original loaned by Mrs. Susan H. Bienvenu.
Photo courtesy of Timothy Pickles.
...coat is a reproduction of the one worn by Lt. Colonel W.S. Hamilton in the War of 1812.

Report Of Inspection Of The Ninth Military Department, 1819

The Mississippi Valley historical review
By Mississippi Valley Historical Association
NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
Published by Mississippi Valley Historical Association, 1921
Item notes: v. 7
http://books.google.com/books?pg=PA261&dq=Inspection+report+of+the+9th+Military&lr=&id=scMLAAAAIAAJ

Report Of Inspection Of The Ninth Military Department, 1819

On May 28, 1814, after his successful campaign against the Creeks, Andrew Jackson was offered and accepted the rank of major general in the United States army, a position which carried the command of the Seventh military district, embracing Louisiana and Mississippi territory.1 When, in the spring of 1815, the army was reorganized on a peace footing with two divisions, Jackson was put in command of the division of the south2 and retained this position until the spring of 1821, when he was appointed governor of the newly acquired province of Florida.3

During much of this period Arthur Perenneau Hayne, the writer of the report herewith printed, was one of Jackson's most intimate friends and trusted lieutenants.4 Colonel Hayne was an elder brother of Robert Y. Hayne, and a grandnephew of Colonel Isaac Hayne, who was hanged by the British military authorities in the revolution.* After four years in business Hayne entered the United States army on May 3, 1808, as first lieutenant of the dragoon regiment commanded by Colonel Wade Hampton. When the war of 1812 opened Hayne was a captain. He served in the operations against Canada, and for his gallant conduct at the battle of Sacket harbor he was promoted to the rank of major and assigned to the First light dragoons in August, 1813. He accompanied General Wilkinson in his unsuccessful operations on the St. Lawrence, soon after which he was attached to the forces under the command of General Jackson, and distinguished himself both in the campaign against the Creeks and in the operations about New Orleans and Pensacola. When reporting the battle of the delta plain Jackson wrote, "Colonel Hayne was everywhere that duty or danger called."6 On April 12, 1814, Hayne was made colonel and inspector general in recognition of his services. After the battle of New Orleans, General Jackson sent Colonel Hayne with dispatches to Washington, and in the letter of instructions evidenced his appreciation of the merits of his subordinate: "I should do no less injustice to my own feelings than to your merits did I not return you my warmest acknowledgements. Be assured, sir, wherever you go, you carry with you my high sense of your services, my thanks for them, and my prayers for your prosperity."7

1 John S. Bassett, The life of Andrew Jackson (New York, 1911), 1:122-123.

2 Ibid,, 1:231.

s James Parton, The life of Andrew Jackson (Boston, 1866), 2:584-585.

* John B. O'Neall, Biographical sketches of the 'bench and bar of South Carolina (Charleston, 1859), 2:18; Theodore D. Jervey, Sobert T. Hayne and his times (New York, 1909), 40.

s Biographical details are given in Francis B. Heitman, Historical register of the United States army, from its organization, September £9, 1889 (Washington, 1890), 331; The national cyclopaedia of American biography (New York, 1900), 11:198; A biographical congressional directory 1774 to 190S: the continental congress: September B, 1774, to October SI, 1788, inclusive: the United States congress: the first congress to the fifty-seventh congress, March 4, 1789, to March 4, 1903 (Washington, 1903), 587.

When the army was reorganized in the spring of 1815 the office of inspector general was abolished; consequently Colonel Hayne was appointed adjutant general in the northern division and was given a furlough for the purpose of pursuing his legal studies, on the completion of which he was admitted to the bar of Pennsylvania. In May, 1816, Hayne again became inspector general attached to the division of the south, where he served until his resignation from the army in September, 1820.

Upon reentering civil life Colonel Hayne returned to South Carolina, where he practiced law and participated in the local political life; for several terms he was a member of the state legislature. Throughout all this time he retained his close relationship with General Jackson, frequently visiting him at the "Hermitage" after his resignation of the governorship of Florida. Indeed, Hayne was among those who convinced Jackson that Calhoun had supported him in the Florida affair of 1818.3

In, 1829 Colonel Hayne was one of South Carolina's presidential electors on the Jackson-Calhoun ticket. When Jackson became president he appointed his old friend naval agent in the

«Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, 2:104.
inid., 2:276.
Ibid., 2:516-517, 544.

Mediterranean, a post which he held for five years; but, when the position of minister to Belgium was offered him, he declined it and returned to private life in Charleston, only to accept, on July 4, 1836, an appointment as major and paymaster in the army. This place he resigned in October of the same year.

Twenty-two years later Hayne was appointed United States senator, in place of J. J. Evans, deceased, and acted in this capacity from May 20, 1858, to January 5, 1859. He died in Charleston on January 7, 1867.

Talbot Chambers was born in Pennsylvania and was appointed a first lieutenant of infantry from that state on June 18, 1808. He attained his captaincy on October 31, 1811, and in April, 1813, was made major and assistant adjutant general. In February, 1814, he was assigned to the Fourth rifle regiment, and was advanced to lieutenant colonel in 1817 and to colonel in 1818. He was transferred to the First infantry in June, 1821. During the war of 1812 he was breveted lieutenant colonel (September, 1814) for gallant conduct in the sortie from Fort Erie. Colonel Chambers' career had an ignominious ending in 1826, when he was cashiered for drunkenness, although the other charges preferred against him were dismissed.9

Willoughby Morgan was appointed captain in the Twelfth infantry in April, 1812, and was promoted to the rank of major in June, 1813. After the war of 1812 was over he was retained in the army as a captain of a rifle regiment, but with a brevet of major; he attained the full rank of major in 1817. Successive promotions brought him to a colonelcy in 1830, two years before his death.10

William Bradford, born in Kentucky, was appointed from that state as captain of infantry in March, 1812, and later was promoted to the rank of major. He was retained as captain with a brevet of major, and in 1822, when with the Fourth infantry, he was made major. He resigned in 1824 and died in October, 1826."

Francis B. Heitman, Historical register and dictionary of the United States army, from its organization, September £9, 1789, to March £, 1903 (Washington, 1903), 1:294; Senate documents, 19 congress, 1 session, volume 4, no. 93.

10 Heitman, Historical register of the United States army (1890), 477.

" Ibid., 140.

Joseph Selden, appointed from Virginia as captain in April, 1812, rose to the rank of major and brevet lieutenant colonel for distinguished service. After the war he was retained as a captain. In 1820 he was transferred to the artillery, four months before he resigned in May.12

Wyly Martin entered the army as first lieutenant from Tennessee in July, 1813, and received an honorable discharge as captain in June, 1815. He was reinstated in December of the same year and served until 1823, when he resigned.13

Matthew J. Magee was a Pennsylvanian and entered service in the war of 1812 as a captain in the Pittsburgh blues, a volunteer. In March, 1813, he was entered in the regular army, from which he was honorably discharged in June, 1815, but was reinstated in the following January as lieutenant of ordnance with brevet of captain from March, 1814. In May he was made captain, the rank antedating to February, 1815. In various regiments of infantry he served until his death in June, 1824."

James Hudson Ballard of Maryland entered the army as second lieutenant in April, 1813. During the war he was regimental adjutant and in 1817 was made captain. In 1822 he was transferred to the artillery, where he served until his death in January, 1823."

Llewellin Hickman, born in Virginia, entered the Second rifle regiment as first lieutenant in March, 1814. He was retained in the same regiment when the war closed, was made captain in February, 1818, and resigned in May, 1820."

Stoughton Gannt, born a Virginian, enlisted in the regular army as surgeon's mate of a rifle regiment in June, 1813. He became first lieutenant in the Fourth rifle regiment and was retained in service after the war. He served successively as paymaster and captain and resigned in April, 1819."

Neither the name Gunnigh nor anything remotely resembling it appears in Heitman.

William Armstrong of Ohio enlisted in the rifles in January,

« Heitman, Historical register of the United States army (1890), 580. " Heitman, Historical register and dictionary of the United States army (1903), 1:693.

i* Ibid., 1:684.
"Ibid., 1:187.
"Ibid., 1:528.
"Ibid., 1:444.

1813, was made a third lieutenant two months later, and a second lieutenant in January, 1814. He remained in the regular army and became a lieutenant in October, 1816, and a captain in July, 1818. He died in service in 1827."

Bennett Biley of Maryland was the only person among the officers mentioned in this report who rose to high rank in the army. He enlisted as a private, became a second lieutenant before the end of the war of 1812, first lieutenant, regimental adjutant, and captain by 1818. In September, 1837, he was major in the Fourth infantry, after having been made brevet major for ten years' faithful service in one rank. In 1839 he became a lieutenant colonel, and colonel on the day when the battle of Chokachatta, Florida, was fought, July 2, 1840, for particularly distinguishing himself by bravery and good conduct as well as for long, meritorious, and gallant service. In the Mexican war he was made brigadier general for gallant and meritorious action in the battle of Cerro Gordo, in April, 1847, and major general for his conduct in the battle of Contreras. He died in the harness in 1853.19

James S. Gray, born in Virginia, enlisted from Kentucky as third lieutenant in the First rifles in May, 1813. He rose to a second lieutenancy and was retained at this rank after the war. He was promoted to a first lieutenancy in 1817, served for some months in 1818 as regimental quartermaster, and became a captain in November of that year. In 1826 he was cashiered."

Thomas Floyd Smith enlisted as a private from Kentucky in a rifle regiment in July, 1813. He was honorably discharged as a second lieutenant in June, 1815, but was reinstated at his old rank in December. He became first lieutenant in 1817, captain in 1819, and in April, 1829, brevet major for ten years' faithful service in one rank. He resigned in October, 1837, and died in 1844."

L. B. S.

"Heitman, Historical registry of the United States army (1903, 1:170.

wibid., 1:831. See also the report of the court of inquiry, held at Puebla, Mexico, to ascertain the facts relating to the battle of Cerro Gordo. House executive documents, 30 congress, 1 session, volume 9, no. 85.

20 Heitman, Historical register and dictionary of the United States army (1903), 1:472.

Col. A. P. Hayne, Report of Inspection of the 9th Military Department, Including Fort Armstrong and Fort Edwards, October, 1819."

Confidential Report Continued.

9th Military Department.23

Talbot Chambers. Col1 Rifle Reg' An attentive, valuable & competent Officer.

Willoughby Morgan. L' Col1 Rifle Regiment, In the Field, active, vigilant, & brave — a man of talents.

William Bradford. Majr Rifle Regiment. Brave, enthusiastic & devoted to his profession.

Jos. Selden, Capt. Rifle Reg' — Intelligent and Gentlemanly.
W. Marten. Capt. Rifle Reg' — An attentive Officer.
Matthew. I. Magee. Capt. Not known.
I. H. Ballard. Capt. The same as the last.
Lewellen Heckman. Capt. The same as the last.

Stoughton Gantt. Capt. One among the most intelligent & valuable
Officers in the Regiment.

I. M. Gunnigh. Capt. Intelligent & industrious & in every respect a valuable Officer.

Wm Armstrong. Capt. Indolent, tho' capable of making a good Officer.

Bennet Riley. Capt. Subordinate, enterprising, active & brave.
J* S. Gray. Capt. Not known.
T. F. Smith 1" Lt. An intelligent, active & valuable Officer.

Progress made in the 9th Military Department, in Discipline, Police, &c &c &°

This Department, till very lately, has been under the immediate Command of Col1 Chambers. In speaking of the Command, I shall refer to his Administration. The Rifle Corps is the only description of Troops that have man'd this Depart' — It will be admitted, when their situation is contrasted with other Regiments of the Army, that they have laboured under many disadvantages. They have not only been disposed by Companies, the natural consequence of their occupying so extensive a Depart' but they have also been employed on fortifications & and other incessant tho' indispensable fatigue duty, without any manner of respit or relaxation. In addition to this, they have existed in the Want of a system of Drill, calculated for that particular Arm of an Army. But every exertion has been resorted to by Col1 Chambers, to remedy this defect. He has devised a system of File Movements predicated on the movements of Light Infantry, & which he has practiced whenever circumstances would permit. They are taught to perform their Evolutions by Bugle Signals. The firing at the Target has been constantly practiced. The Interior economy & police of the Regiment is excellent — & so soon as concentration is effected, this Regiment will perform all of it's Movements, with that Celerity & Promptitude which ever ought to characterise Riflemen. — Col1 Chambers is a faithful & vigilant Officer; — none more so in our Army; — & is in every respect acquainted with his Duty. The Field, & company Officers, are generally acquainted with their Duty. The Adjutants, Quarter Master & Pay Masters are competent to the Duties assigned them. The Provisions have been of good quality. The Forage sufficient. Hospital Supplies sufficient.

22 This report is a transcript of a pbotostatic copy, in the possession of the Illinois state historical library, of United States war department, inspector general's office, Inspection record, 1814-1823, pp. 110-124.

23 Departments eight and nine were in the division of the south. The department headquarters were at Belle Fontaine in Missouri territory, while other posts within the department were at Belle Pointe on the Arkansas, Fort Osage on the Missouri river, Fort Edwards on the Mississippi, Fort Armstrong at Rock Island, and Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien; a garrison and an arsenal were located at Newport, Kentucky. Report for October, 1818, in American state papers: military affairs, 1:790.

The Ordna[n]ce Department, altho' superintended by an Officer of Talents, Zeal & Industry, has proven in some respects defective.

The Powder Horns for the Reg' are too small, & not water proof.
Report of the different Posts in the 9th Department, while under the
Command of Col1 Chambers.

Fort Crawford ** (Les Praire des Chiens) is an Indian work, composed of strong Oak Logs, of a square form, with two block houses, each containing a twelve & six pounder. The Curtain of the Work is formed by the buildings, with appropriate loop holes, & and the Angles strongly Picketed. The Quarters are very neat and comfortable & capable of accomodating 400 men, with the necessary Store Houses &c comprised in the Curtain of the Work. It's local situation is an extensive Praire, surrounded by immense high hills, but too distant to command the Work, if occupied by an enemy. It is capable of defending itself against any combined Indian attack, altho' it is in the power of the Indians in 12 days to assemble 2000 Warriors. But it is not calculated to sustain an attack against Artillery. The greatest disadvantage which it labours under, is the inconvenience of procuring wood, which cannot be done at a less distance than Six Miles; — & then attended with uncommon trouble & fatigue; — & in a state of War wd be would [sic] constantly be exposed to a predatory attack from the Indians. One half of the Command is generally exposed to the collection of Wood, from one to three months every fall Season. The Site is healthy & if necessary could be supported by the productions of the surrounding Country. Fort Armstrong,TM (situate at the Mouth of Rock River) is in the neighborhood of the Souxs and & Fox tribes of Indians. It commands the Mississippi River — is of a square form — composed of strong Oak Logs, well built, with Two block houses, each mounting a Twelve & a Six pounder, & capable of quartering two Companies, but subjecte to be commanded by a Neighbouring height at point blanque distance. It is however sufficiently strong to repel any attack from the Indians — & with the exception of Provisions has every necessary article within reach — the former of which can be procured from Sl Louis. Belle Fontaine M is considered at present as the Depot of this Department. It stands within about four miles of the Confluence of the Missouri & Mississippi Rivers. The Cantonment is very illy constructed & with the exception of the Store houses is in a state of Delapidation. As a Depot it is very inconvenient, in consequence of its distance from Sl Louis, & and the difficulty & danger which attends the Ascent & Descent of the Missouri River. It has been in contemplation to erect a more suitable establishment on a site more contiguous to Sl Louis, & which affords an excellent harbor for boats &c but the Comd1 of the Depart1 deemed the price of the Land on which it was intended to be erected too extravagant. ,

2* Military authorities determined in the summer of 1815 to make a strong military post and Indian factory at the mouth of the Wisconsin river. Not until the next year, however, was the work actually begun under the direction of John W. Johnson, the agent appointed for this place. Wisconsin historical collections, 19:383-384, and note.

Fort Smith " (situate at Belle Point, about 500 miles up the Arkinsaw River) is now in a state of progression. It is intended to be a square Work of Strong Timber, calculated for Indian Defence & to Quarter one ComT with the necessary Store Houses &c —

« Fort Armstrong was established in 1816 as one of the links in a chain of posts to protect the western frontier. Clarence W. Alvord, The Illinois country, 1673-1818 (Centennial history of Illinois, volume 1 — Springfield, 1920), 451.

2 Belle Fontaine, the department headquarters and cantonment, was established by General James Wilkinson in 1806 at a point north of the mouth of the Missouri. The> fort was virtually abandoned the next year when Wilkinson went south on account of the Burr affair. William B. Davis and Daniel S. Durrie, An illustrated history of Missouri comprising it» early record, and civti, political, and military history from the first exploration to the present time (Cincinnati, 1876), 51.

7 The construction of Fort Smith was begun in 1817 with the establishment of an army post. A town of the same name grew up and eventually the surrounding country was made into the county of Fort Smith. This was for many years the principal depot for the western posts. It was abandoned in 1871, after it had played a part in the civil war. Fay Hempstead, Historical review of Arkansas: its flommerct, industry and modern affairs (Chicago, 1911), 1:523.

Fort Edwards 23 on the Mississippi & Fort Osage 29 on the Missouri, orders have been issued for their abandonment — the latter is in a state of dilapidation.

I [sic] will be perceived from the above description of the Posts & Fortification, how much severe fatigue Duty the Rifle Corps has performed.

The late accession of Two Regiments of Infantry to this Department of the Army, may be looked upon as a very fortunate Circumstance. For all the Posts comprised within the limits of the Department, in consequence of the enfeebled state of the Commands were perfectly incapacitated from resorting to Offensive operations, in any event, or even of enforcing the U. S. Laws. The limited number of Troops, would not on any occasion have admitted the making of such Detachments, as w3 have made a Salutary impression on the minds of the Indians. I have heretofore looked upon the Posts in this Department, as being of very little real value; — & in the event of a sudden rapture, w4 have shared the fate of all trivial & weak establishments, situated at a great distance from each other: — and from starvation & other causes w4 it is more than probable have fallen in regular succession, & accompanied by frequent Massacres, as during the commencement of the late War. But it is believed, that the weak & exposed Flank of our Country is now safe. In speaking of this interesting Country, & the proper mode of Defending it, the following is the substance of a communication I have lately received from one of my Military correspondents in that Quarter.

The Indians in the Missouri Country compose a number of Warriors well armed and mounted. For attack, not less than 15,000 can be concentrated at any given point. This force is exclusive of the Sioux's & Chippaways of the plains of the Mississippi, with whom they are in the habit of conferring & with whom they cd cooperate by the way of Stony Lake in three weeks. The latter tribes are remarkably brave & expert in War, & are jealous of the American character, & completely under the control of the British Companies, particularly that of the "Hudson Bay," who have been and are still incessantly Cabaling to induce the

23 After the repulse of Taylor when he was trying to drive the British and the Indians from Rock Island in August, 1814, this post was established. Alvord, The Illinois country, 1673-1818, p. 447.

»Fort Osage was also variously known as Fort Clark and Fort Sibley. It was built in 1808 on a bluff one mile from Sibley on land bought from the Osage Indians, the "six-mile tract." At the time Colonel Haynos made his inspection, Fort Osage was the extreme frontier settlement, some 330 miles above the mouth of the Missouri. Encyclopedia of the history of Missouri (St. Louis, 1901), 2:492; Louis Houck, A history of Missouri from the earliest explorations and settlements until the admission of the state into the union (Chicago, 1908), 3:148.


Indians to oppose our making any additional establishments on the Mississippi & Missouri Rivers. Whether they will succeed or not in their views is still uncertain. But it has been the impression, & is still believed, that if a respectable & well appointed force is not kept in that country they will be induced to become hostile.

In the establishment of the Posts on the Missouri it is therefore respectfully submitted for consideration the propriety of holding but few positions & having them well situated & completely formed & strongly manned, with a disposable force of mounted men. Thus an excursion could be promptly made to punish any Depredations which might be attempted on the part of the Indians. The advantages that w4 result from having the Troops thus formed & equip' seems very apparent. It w4 enable the Troops to supply themselves with the Product of the Country, which can only be obtained by cultivating the Soil & Hunting Excursion. If we have not large parties to send out on this Duty, the Indians becomet emboldened will either attack them or drive the game off (which can be easily done) beyond our reach. They will also have it in their power to harass & annoy our small parties which can always be done with impunity if they are mounted & we destitute of horsemen in that Campaign Country: — & the consequence will be that we lose our respectable standing in their estimation: — and they will then listen to the artful suggestion of our implacable enemies the British — commence hostilities — cut off our supplies — & reduce us to a state of starvation.

Therefore taking into consideration the general aspect of the Country in Question — it being so exclusively calculated for the operations of Mounted men; — the total impracticability of our being able to enforce the United States Laws, governing Indian trade, if concise measures are not resorted to & for which purpose a respectable mil7 force seems necessary. I w4 by leave under this view of the subject to suggest the occupancy of but Two positions — vis — Mandanso & the Mouth of the Yellow Stone Kiver.31 The former position is in the neighbourhood of the "Hudson Bay" Company establishment — where their movements & motions can be narrowly watched & detected — & besides a ready communication can be supported with the establish' in S' Peters River s2 by the way of Stoney Lake.33 The Post at Yellow Stone it is presumed will communicate with the establish' on the Arkensaw River, & detect any insidious attempt from that Quarter by the Spaniards, who frequently visit that Country. The two positions above recommended would require at least 400 men each, mounted and armed with Swords & Rifles or Muskets. It is calculated that one fourth of the Command at each Post including sick men & those otherwise disabled, will be sufficient to perform all the necessary fatigue attendant on Cultivation, whilst the remainder completely armed & rendered expert, by attending solely to the duties of Soldiers, & divided into Three several Detachments, will Scour the Country throughly & at the same time supply the Command with Wild meat. Under proper arrangements, the expense of mounting & equiping the Command, w4 not be very considerable. Horses can be procured, I am informed for $10 (in trade) a head. Saddles, Bridles &c — cd be manufactured, from the Skins which are taken. And after having once received a supply of Horses, by proper management, we shall require no more by purchase. Thus formed and equiped the Corps could act in the Three fold capacity of Dragoons Infantry & Riflemen.

30 Lewis and Clark established a fort on the left bank of the Missouri for their winter quarters in 1804-1805. The location was seven or eight miles below the mouth of the Knife river, nearly opposite the site of Fort Clark, which became a fortified trading post in 1822 and a true frontier fort in 1831, erected by the American fur company. Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition, 1804-1806, edited by Reuben G. Thwaites (New York, 1904), 1:217, note. Hiram M. Chittenden, The American fur trade of the far west; a history of pioneer trading posts and early fur companies of the Missouri valley and the Roclcy mountains and of the overland commerce with Santa Fe (New York, 1900), 3:957.

si The first post at the mouth of the Yellowstone was established by Ashley and Henry in 1822, but it was abandoned the next year. In 1828 a party sent out by Kenneth McKenzie built what was probably called Fort Floyd, and the next year Fort Union, which had been located some two hundred miles up the Yellowstone, was erected on the Missouri. Chittenden, American fur trade of the far west, 3:958-960.

I have the honor, to submit the foregoing remarks to the Comd* Gen1 under the belief, that it presents a subject worthly of his most serious consideration. I beg leave also to Subjoin, some general reflections on the importance of Cavalry Service, believing as I do that this branch of our Service, has been entirely overlooked & that it is a subject of vital importance to our Country, whenever she is again engaged in European Warfare. Of the expediency of Mounted men to connect our distant posts on the Western & Noth western frontier of our Country, there can be but one opinion.

Cavalry Corps.

'' Cavalry we have little need of; — the enemy cannot send against us any considerable force of that description by Sea, & our Northern Frontiers are unfavorable to its movements."

32 In September, 1819, a command under Leavenworth established itself on the south bank of the St. Peter's or Minnesota river, at Mendota, at the confluence with the Mississippi. The following year work was begun on a permanent work across the river. Fort St. Anthony, as it was called, became the later Fort Snelling. Richard W. Johnson, "Fort Snelling from its foundation to the present time," in Minnesota historical collections, 8:426-428.

33 Big Stone Lake.

"By W» Theobald Wolfe Tone"

"formerly Officer of Light Cavalry
& Aid De Camp in the French Service
& member of the Legion of Honor.''
Chapter 6 — page. 74.

I must enter my Dissent to the Opinion expresses in the above Quotation— altho' as far as I have been able to judge, it seems to offer the general sentiment of the Nation. The Argument seems to me to be a very plain one; — & the following are my reasons.

The Cavalry, is that Arm of an Army, which is peculiarly adapted, to the Defence of the United States. No Nation, not even the Arabs ex- cepted, are as good horsemen as the Independent Yeomanry of the Western and South Western Section's of our Country. The Boy is there taught, at the earliest period to ride, & to value himself upon his skill in horsemanship; — after which the gun is placed in his hands, & the Chase becomes not only a favorite but highly useful employment. Our Horses too are as well adapted for Cavalry Service, as those of any other Nation.

I think, it will hardly be denied, That when Two Hostile Armies take the Field against each other, & are in every respect upon an equality — whose Chiefs, are on a footing, in point of Military Talent and Capacity for War — whose Discipline,' Munitions & Equipment are alike; — but the one of them possessed of a decided superiority in a well appointed Cavalry; — that the one possessed of this superiority must always be victorious. This opinion (I must say Fact.) is clearly supported, as well by History, as the opinions of Military men. It will also be admitted, that in the best & most perfect Organized Armies, from the Days of Caesar, to the period when Bonaparte invaded the Russian Empire, That the the Cavalry always composed a most respectable portion of all Armies.

Now in those Wars, which may take place at a future period, such is the great distance & expense of transporting Cavalry across the Atlantic. That the Nations of Europe can never avail themselves of this useful species of Troops. And hence the conclusion is irresistible, That European Armies invading this Country & being destitute of that important Arm of an Army, can never make head against an American Army, supported by superior & well appointed Cavalry Corps. For this superiority in every instance in which, it is supported by equal Genius in the Chief, decides the Victory. And this is a Desideratum in the Mititan History of our Country, which is peculiar to the Country itself; — & fraught with the most important consequences if properly attended to; — & is well worthy of the serious & most mature reflection & deliberation of the Government.

Again, in Military affairs, we are taught by experience, how to set a proper value on time. Now, it is Celerity of Movement above all things, that most effectually places us in a situation to command time. And to bring about so desirable an event, Cavalry Corps are the most active & important agent used on the occasion. It was Celerity of Movement & the result produced there from which exhibited the French Army under the Dynasty of Bonaparte as the most perfect that ever existed. The cause and the effect are here clearly perceived.

I hazard nothing in saying, that Two Hundred Veteran Cavalry, after the Battle of Chippewa, led on by a William Washington, w4 have captured the whole British Army. What a saving of Blood & money would this have been to the Nation. But the American Army was on that occasion destitute of Cavalry. It has been contended tho', & by Officers of the highest Grade on the the [sic] Niagara Frontier, That the Country about Fort George was by no means calculated for the operations of Cavalry. But 1 assume the position, That after Defeat, Cavalry are always effectual & efficient. The Charge of Cavalry after the Defeat of the Enemy is by independent File, each horseman acting in his own individual Capacity. Under such circumstances, it matters but little, if the face of the Country is Bough. But previous to Defeat, if the Charge is to be made upon unbroken Infantry — it is always done in line in Column. In the latter case, the Country about Fort George, wd be unfavorable for Cavalry operation. I have always been under the impres- srion, that your Campaign against the the [sic] Creek Nation of Indians, wd have failed, without the prompt aid of your Mounted men.'*

I will hear mention another circumstance which tho' it may appear Curious, is nevertheless true — vis: — That it is in the Cavalry service, that the best and most efficient Officers are found. Corps of this Description are always in the presence of the enemy — their Officers are ever at the Head of separate & independent commands — depending upon the resources of their own Genius & constantly exercising their own judgment, & to which we may add the fact, that where the Artillery & Infantry Officer is in one Battle, the Cavalry and Rifle Officer is ten times. It is in the hour of battle — it is at that perilous Crisis, that Mil7 Genius Develops itself; — & it is in that situation that such men as the gallant Howard of Revolutionary fame,35 could ever feel the full extent of his Capacity, talents, & Mily Genius.

s* General Jackson's operations against the Creeks, 1813-1814. One regiment of volunteer cavalry and one of mounted riflemen had been used to good advantage in the Fort Strother affair, November 3, 1813, and in the later phases of the campaign. Bassett, Life of Andrew Jackson, 1: chapters 7 and 8.

The Moral effect of horsemen in all armies, more especially in their operating against Savage Nations, is much greater than is generally imagined. In the formation of all armies to a certain extent, one mounted man, is worth ten foot Soldiers.

Let it be remembered too, that well appointed Cavalry Corps are not to be formed in a day. The King of Prussia, who was in an especial manner the Father of this Species of Troops, & whose Cavalry was the finest & the most perfect the World has ever seen, said it w4 take 5 yrs to form a Veteran Dragoon. In oiir Country it w* certainly take half that time.

And finally without Cavalry in a regular Campaign, none of the Fruits of victory can be realized — without Cavaltry Mil7 operations are reduced to a mere mechanical opposition of strength — because the Cavalry alone can give those last & fine touches to Victory which make it complete and render it effectual.

All of which, is respectfully,

submitted to yr consideration
by yr ob1 ser*
A. P. Hayne

Insp' Gen1

To. S° Div.

Majr Gen1 A. Jackson Octr 1819.

Comd* S° Army.
Hd QTM Nashville.

Approved.

[Indorsement:] Confidential report of the Inspector Genl Col Hoyne on the Southern Division of the U S Army in 1819 — No- 2

** Lieutenant Colonel Howard, in the battle of Cowpens, turned the tide against Tarleton's forces by leading an attack of his continentals. It was in this engagement, as well, that Lieutenant Colonel Washington used his cavalry to such advantage against the British horse. Robert Tomes, Battles of America by sea and land: consisting of the colonial and revolutionary battles, the tear of 1812, and the Mexican campaigns; with biographies of naval and military commanders, and illustrative anecdotes (New York, 1861), 2:301, 302.

Petronius Didn't Say It !

on wikipedia I recently ran across this interesting vignette on one of the first and most poignant of authors that fired my military history interests - Charlton Ogburn, Jay Luvass (who presented me with his book on LTG Eichelberger after escorting him at USMA in '76), Kenneth Roberts, Burt Loescher, Lloyd Lewis, Bruce Catton, JFC Fuller, Robert Utley, Clay Blair, Ward Just, Christopher Sykes, Paddy Griffiths, Shelford Bidwell, Charles N. Hunter and many more)

But I digress:

I was intrigued to learn that the above favorite apocryphal quotation of mine came from Ogburn!

"The following quotation, or variants of it, is frequently misattributed to Petronius. The quotation actually is by Charlton Ogburn, Jr.

We trained hard ... but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.

Ogburn authored this in an article published by Harper's Magazine in 1957. This recounts his experiences as a junior officer in the famous World War II U.S. Army unit known as Merrill's Marauders, and the quoted passage refers to his somewhat chaotic early training. In full, it reads as follows:

We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganised. Presumably the plans for our employment were being changed. I was to learn later in life that, perhaps because we are so good at organising, we tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization."

"Charlton Ogburn, Jr. (15 March 1911 - 19 October 1998) was an author and freelance professional writer. He was the author of over a dozen books and numerous magazine articles. The Marauders (1959), his first person account of the Burma Campaign in World War II, may be his best-known work; it was later made into the film Merrill's Marauders (1962)." source-
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlton_Ogburn

Linking Yesterday with Today's Transformation

I recently noticed how two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) took the same "nickname" from Greek History - the legendary "Spartans." While I recognize the choice as a fan of the old 1962 movie The 300 Spartans - and applaud the new "300" - I can't help but hope some of the new BCT's look into and draw from some overlooked American terms like LongKnives, Riflemen, Sharpshooters.. ....I wrote the below in 2006:

Essay - Linking Yesterday with Today's Transformation:
Today's Army is transforming into a modular Brigade concept, and historically minded leaders are rightly evoking the past to justify the changing of long standing units (at least by American standards) from one construct to another. Take, for example, the 2nd Armored Cavalry, recently returned from Iraq after deployment from Ft. Polk. Now stationed at Ft. Lewis and officially re-named the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, albeit it is an infantry-equipped Stryker Brigade Combat Team. It will next be re-flagged as a Brigade Combat Team under the 2nd Infantry Division, but not to go away. Subsequently it is earmarked to reappear in Germany as our lone ground force commitment to Europe. If that isn't somewhat confusing for non-Army folks to follow, it calls itself the "Second Dragoons" - which was actually, their first title when formed in 1836, in response to the increasing trouble in Florida during the Second Seminole War. They proved then that mounted troops (most were mounted) could wage a mobile fight in the mixed jungle and scrub, terrain.

So, what's in a name, right? In fact, the fighting Army is replete with such unique historical stories - the 1st Infantry is not the oldest regiment - that would be the 3rd Infantry - "Old Guard."

There is one unit seemingly forgotten and overlooked, that in light of today's transformation, if not for other reason, deserves to be remembered. It is the Regiment of Riflemen, which was "unquestionably the most effective infantry formation fielded by the United States in the War of 1812" in the estimation of its foremost historian John F. Fredriksen, author of "GREEN COATS AND GLORY: THE UNITED STATES REGIMENT OF RIFLEMEN, 1808-1821" Old Fort Niagara Assoc., Youngstown, NY, 200 or see Issue No.1 & 2, 1998, Vol. 50 of MILITARY COLLECTOR & HISTORIAN.

The argument considered:
It is my contention that the Regiment(s) of Riflemen (1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th), forgotten as they are, justly deserve to be considered part of the evolution of the U.S. Army Ranger concept and, therefore, should be included in the Ranger historical lineage.
Consider:
1: In tactics, organization, and qualifications the US Regiment of Riflemen belongs to the Ranger story - especially as the ranger story rightly includes Morgan's Riflemen/Rangers but allows for Mosby's Rangers (a partisan-ranger outfit) belonging to an opposing army! (I also make the case for the US Sharpshooter Regiments (1st & 2nd)
2: The few military historians who have studied the US Rifle Regiments' actions are in agreement that, in the use of concealment, marksmanship, aimed fire, skirmish, ambush, raid, and spearhead tactics, they pointed the way to the future employment of "modern Ranger infantry."
3: If not recognized by the Rangers, at least the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen - today's 3rd Armored cavalry regiment - should have the decency and smarts to add this unit to its legacy.
4: A study of the US Voltigeur & Foot Riflemen organization and actions in the Mexican War justifies its inclusion in the spearhead story of ranger operations and rescue from oblivion, as with its ancestor Rifle Regiments.

For starters, I disagree with Fredriksen - an outstanding historian and fine gentleman who consented to my use of his work on this for academic-use website - and the tenor of conclusion from "Green Coats and Glory" : "Discounting incidental formations like the Voltigeurs of the Mexican War and a small Regiment of Mounted Riflemen it was not until the advent of Hiram Berdan's sharpshooters in 1861 that the United States Army possessed a unit of green-clad specialists to carry on traditions of American riflemen." pp.71-72

Upon closer scrutiny, I believe this assertion is, at best, too simplistic and, at worst, misleading.First, the U.S. Regiment of Mounted Riflemen was and is NOT an incidental unit (not that Fredriksen literally meant this)! Witness that they became the 3rd Cavalry who begat the modern 3rd Armored Cavalry and, as evidenced in Iraq to date, have seen their fair share of "foot" slogging and have "led the way" in adaptation to COIN operations (*see excerpt from article below).

Moreover, I argue that the evolution of dispersed rifled infantry tactics, the selection of uniquely skilled and fit men, and the need for specialized units to execute irregular tactics as well as the traditional skirmish, ambush and assault missions, using the best means of mobility available, truly and firmly puts the US Rifle Regiments, US Voltigeur & Foot Riflemen Regiment, and the US Sharpshooter Regiments in the US Army Dragoon, Mounted Riflemen and US Army Ranger traditions. Any of these current formations can make a legitimate claim to the legacies of these "forgotten" units. As concerns the ranger tradition, the problem has continued to be exacerbated by the "wanna make a buck" authors - so-called ranger-historians - who have foisted much repetitious scholarship on the military history buying readership. Even respected military historians have overlooked the ranger's War of 1812 and mounted past.

For example, official lineal descendants such as the rangers of the War of 1812 (Foot and Mounted) and Mounted Rangers of 1832 have been given extremely short shrift, especially when one compares their treatment with the dubious claims, on official and historical organization and mission grounds, to such glamorous units such as Mosby Rangers - CSA partisan rangers - or even the "Swamp Fox" - Francis Marion's partisans of the Revolution. It is important too to stress that these units were all mounted formations!

Through such shallow or incomplete research they have shortchanged themselves of the opportunity to include these units in a serious, chronological discussion of the legacy and evolution of the Ranger story. Stronger cases could be made for units such as the US Regiment of Riflemen and the US Sharpshooter Regiments - not the least of which was that they were regular US Army units! - than Revolutionary militia units such as Marion's partisans or Confederate Army units! (One must make an exception for Rogers and other appropriate colonial Rangers before the Revolution.)

In tactics, organization, and personnel qualifications, Riflemen and Sharpshooters, belong to the Ranger story.

In their use of concealment, aimed fire, skirmish, ambush, raid, and spearhead tactics, they truly "led the way" to the future employment of "modern" Ranger infantry. The same can be said for the Dragoon, Mounted Riflemen, and Light Infantry legacies. One need only observe the OIF COIN usage and up-armored adaptations of today's formations - be they Stryker, armored Cavalry, or Light - and then compare with the discussions of the period 1815-1850 - to see that relevance. Dragoons and Mounted Riflemen of the 1830s were evolutionary heirs of the mounted Riflemen and Rangers since colonial times. Thus the case for arguments 1 and 2.

For argument 3 - that the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen should add this unit to its legacy - here is the rest of the story: Fredriksen, in summing up, describes how, in 1837, then Major Bennet Riley (Ft. Riley Kansas named in his honor) unsuccessfully appealed to Congress in discussions on reforming a rifle regiment:
"It is my opinion that a rifle regiment should be added to the peace establishment, as two wars have shown us that rifleman are the most efficient troops that were ever deployed by our country. Where can you find troops more efficient than Morgan's riflemen of the Revolution or Forsyth's riflemen of the last war with Great Britain?"

Fredriksen further mentions another attempt in 1841 to form two rifle regiments. But he should have gone further. In 1819, Inspector General Colonel Arthur Perenneau Hayne saw clearly that consolidating the number of posts to three strategically placed positions and mounting troops of the caliber of the Rifle Regiment: "Under proper arrangement, the expense of mounting & equipping the Command would not be very considerable...thus formed and equipped the Corps could act in the Three fold capacity of Dragoons, Infantry and Riflemen." - Report of Inspection of the Ninth Military Department, 1819 - L. B. S. The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Dec., 1920), pp. 261-274

The seeds of this inclusive approach are aptly captured in Dr. Wayne R. Austerman's, "This Excellent & Gallant Rifle Corps; The Model 1803 Harpers Ferry in Service." published in Man at Arms, Vol.3, No.4, July/August 1981 (cited by Fredriksen). Dr. Austerman vividly describes the essential challenges and requirements that demanded the tactics, techniques and procedures, that an appropriately armed and mobile force would need in confronting the Plains tribes while on escort and constabulary duties in the opening west. The actions of the 6th Infantry, and particularly those of of Maj Bennett Riley, pointed directly to the need for a well-armed, mobile and highly disciplined and competent force of regulars to demand the respect of the tribes. The absorption of the dissolved Rifle Regiment into the 6th Infantry, an "illogical" organizational mistake, forced from on high, nevertheless, provided both the means (Model 1803 rifle), tactical approach (swifter dispersed rifle formations vice slow moving linear, line infantry movements) and aggressive leadership demanded in the new area of operations.

The dismounting of Dragoons and even Artillery in the Seminole Wars and the "official" dismounting and re-designation of the 2nd Dragoons in 1842, to "Regiment of Riflemen," albeit for only one year, points to the continuity of the Rifle concept. Furthermore, by examining the 1846 Congressional debate, which resulted in the creation of the US Regiment of Mounted Riflemen - today's 3rd Armored cavalry - one might see that its creation was not far removed from these earlier attempts in time or perhaps, more importantly, informed memory, to resurrect the Riflemen concept.

As it is, the basis for this linkage is easily found in the Army's own book "Army Lineage: Armor-Cavalry."

Concerning the 2nd Dragoons it is stated: "They thus became the first Rifle Corps included in the establishment for two decades, that is, since the Rifle Regiment had been disbanded in 1821. The erstwhile horsemen, who felt degraded on foot, clung hard to their dragoon organization, but they received rifles and, as far as is known, trained as riflemen. Agitation to remount them was continuous, and within a year they became the 2nd Dragoons again (later the 2nd US Cavalry). When they were reconverted, rifle corps disappeared once more from the Army, except that the President received authority from Congress to convert two or more infantry regiments into rifles if he thought it expedient. He never exercised this authority."

This last sentence, however, overlooks the ideas, executive and congressional, behind the Mounted Riflemen and Voltigeurs: Indeed, as concerns the 1846 debate, it is worth noting that the title "Two Regiments of Riflemen" was used in the Congressional articles and banner without the term "mounted." Now, this is explainable perhaps due to article space considerations yet, in reading the debate itself, it is quite apparent that the writers and Congressmen were cognizant of the tradition and uniqueness of the Regiment of Riflemen from 1808-1821.

Moreover, the "mounted versus foot" debate was only one, , and not the most important, item amongst a host of constitutional, officering and manning - "regulars versus militia," - issues at play.
"(Mr Haralson) was willing to see the President vested with the power to mount or dismount such portions of the two regiments as he might at any time deem requisite and proper. He was not of the opinion, however, for reasons which he would state, that the whole of this increased force should consist of mounted men....Although the bill itself did not designate the particular service in which this force should be employed, yet it had been announced that a portion of it at least was to be put on the line of emigration to Oregon. he asked gentlemen to consult their own good sense on this point. Would mounted men be required altogether at the stockades? Was not every man who knew anything of military matters aware, that certain services were required to be performed in and about these stockades, and that it would be useless that every man there should have a horse? A detachment of one or two companies must remain at every one of the forts, not only to protect emigration, but to protect the public property. It was indeed requisite, that a portion should be mounted, in case of Indian, attacks, or to escort emigration, if necessary, and to perform other services in which the speed of mounted men might be required--to repel invasion, or to pursue and enemy retreating into the prairies, and whom men on foot could not reach. A mixed force, therefore, at the discretion of the president, or of the commanding officer on that particular service, was required."-- Congressman Haralson, Georgia, March 26, 1846.

In actuality, the "mounted versus foot" - mission and organizational - issue was primarily a question of anticipated expenditures, the constitutionality of Executive-branch employment prerogatives and, from the opposition point of view, secretive schemes afoot (many in Congress opposed Polk's war). The US Army's experiences in the western river expeditions of 1817-1821, in which the Rifle Regiment was chosen for specific reasons and proved to play such a prominent and critical part, also informed the debate. The new regiment was to be formed "specially designed for to protect American emmigration and the commerce of the prairies." - Congressman McClernand, Illinois, April 10, 1846.

They also discussed the essential composition of the unit in terms of the source and caliber of officers and men to be recruited or transferred. What emerges from a reading here is a striking similarity between that of the Regiment(s) of Riflemen (in original intent and proven execution) and the new Regiment of Mounted Riflemen especially as concerns recruitment, caliber, and expected performance of the men - as Congressman Haralson eloquently expressed:
"What kind of me do you want on that service? ...men taken from your large cities --a trodden down, spiritless sot, such as would receive the lash, if it were requisite to apply it? Surely not. We want no such material for an army. We want men who are bound to the institutions o' the land, who love their country for their country's sake, and who acknowledge that the first great law of that country is obedience to the laws;men who in serving as privates, would not find themselves degraded. Such are the men we want; such the men who are to be found in the South, and on our western prairies, who breathe the pure atmosphere of liberty, and who know its blessings, and feel it no degradation to fight for them, if necessary. The gentleman also thought proper to speak of the insubordination of our army, and of a force to be raised from the freemen of the west. I have no fear that a regiment from the western States would bear out the description he has given. In 1813 and 1814 the western men did not show that spirit of insubordination. They have never done so when the tocsin was sounded and the drum beat, and they were called on to serve their country; nor do I think I will ever do so. We want men acquainted with pioneer life, who have been accustomed to the woods-men who can sit in the saddle, and who know how to manage a horse, and the use of the never-failing rifle-who can pursue an enemy, and whose habit of life are such, that they can wrap themselves in a blanket at night, and comfortably in the open air, contented to be in the service of their country....By and through them,a knowledge of the country will be obtained, which would lead to its settlement, in many instances, by the discharged soldiers themselves." -- Congressman Haralson, Georgia, March 26, 1846.*American State Papers, 1789-1838 Thirty-eight volumes

When formed, a young lieutenant Grant would bemoan that Polk had chosen to play favorites in officering the Mounted Riflemen:
"Don't you think Mr. Polk has done the officers of the army injustice by filling up the new regiment of riflemen from citizens?* It is plain to be seen that we have but little to expect from him..." "NB-* Grant had applied for a command in this regiment. For political reasons the bill authorizing the equipment of the regiment specified that it should be officered from civilian ranks." - Letter to J. W. LOWE, Esq., Batavia, Ohio from U. S. GRANT, 4th Infy. - in McClure's Magazine, 1896, p 370.

If direct evidence could be found pinning Riley's 1837 testimony and his or other official's "lessons learned" from the 6th Infantry experiences to the 1846 Congressional debate and subsequent legislation establishing a new "regiment of Riflemen," albeit mounted or half-mounted, then a direct linkage could be established between the Regiment of Riflemen of 1808-1821 and the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen (1846-present).
In this way the Regiment of Riflemen could directly be included in the Mounted Riflemen's - 3rd Armored Cavalry's - story. Conceptually, however, it is easy to see and make the connection.

The short history of the U. S. Regiment of Voltigeurs & Foot Riflemen also deserves mention, if not inclusion, in the lineage of the Rangers - their battle record speaks for itself and was in the Ranger "spearhead" tradition - witness their storming of Chapultepec castle. Research convinces me that there is a direct doctrinal connection of the 1808-1821 Regiment of Riflemen (lead spearhead amphibious assault on York Upper Canada), to the 1846 Mounted Riflemen (*Brave Rifles!) and to the 1847-48 U.S. Regiment of Voltigeurs & Foot Riflemen (half foot - half mounted) - both forced to fight on foot during the Mexican-American War, despite their intended mounted capability.

The 1837, 1841, 1846 and 1847 rifle regiment discussions, legislation, and creations - resulting in the U.S. Mounted Rifle Regiment in 1846 and U.S. Regiment of Voltigeurs & Foot Riflemen in 1847 - are not "incidental"** to the story of the old U.S. Regiment of Riflemen and by extension the US Sharpshooters or, from a modern perspective, the evolution to WWII Ranger and today's Ranger or Armored Cavalry/Dragoon/Stryker formations.

In conclusion, the search for newer forms of weaponry and mobility do not obviate but rather reinforce these strong, organizational and tactical historical ties of regular US Army foot or mounted Rangers, foot or mounted Rifle formations, and Sharpshooters. The name "Corps of Rangers," "Ranger Corps," "Rifle Corps," "Regiment of Riflemen," "Rifle Regiment," or even "Rifles," had a military cultural and historical connotation that fixed it in the minds of soldiers and politicians of their day.Congress and Army bureaucrats failed to maintain, foster, and nurture in the reorganization schemes of their day. From this, as has been long known and often stated, a distinctly formidable, combat proven, and proud legacy, that directly tied the Army to its Continental and early Army "roots" was, thereby, denied and "lost" for more than one regular Army unit still serving today. For units such as the Rangers and Rifles this was doubly so.To perpetuate the folly by which a young nation's legislators and bureaucrats dealt with the army's "regimental system" of its day, is to impose a needless constraint. If the army can re-organize each decade or so (it seems) we should also be able to re-dedicate. If today's Brigade Combat Team - BCT - can adopt such non-American, but bold, nicknames as "Spartans" then surely others can "buy American" and change their nickname or add the Riflemen legacy to further foster their ESPRIT DE CORPS!



2009 -kudos to the Mountain Warrior Battalion (USAREC); see
The Legacy of the US Army "Mountain Warrior"


For a bold, and original systematic and comprehensive look at a possible inclusive unit naming/reflagging and lineage remembrance scheme, necessitated by the Army transforms to Brigade Combat Teams, I recommend a reading of Karl Lowe's:
Reshaping America’s Army
"The reorganization of the Army calls for a comprehensive reflagging to revive and maintain historic division lineages and perpetuate the esprit de corps of proud units."
ARMY Magazine - March 2005 -03/01/2005- Volume 55, Number 3