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Antietam, South Mountain 150th and family connection

This post was inspired by watching CSPAN's coverage of the 150th Battle Anniversary and, thereby, in remembrance of my earliest paternal great-grandfather, who first owned land on the western side of South Mountain; the scene of bloody fighting a little more than a century later - principally on September 17, 1862.

To begin with, I cite a recent book to summarize this crucial campaign, with regard to South Mountain, to the fate of the nation and its people, free and slave:

"Before Antietam: The Battle for South Mountain, John Michael Priest, White Mane Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2011, 433 pages
"Book description :
Civil War buffs and scholars quickly recognize the dates of September 16-18, 1862 as the period marking the bloodiest battle of the entire campaign--Antietam. But until now, the ten days prior to that event have remained in relative obscurity. In Before Antietem, John Michael Priest offers the first book-length, tactical exploration of the Maryland campaign and the Battles of South Mountain, describing the decisive events leading up to the famous battle and elevating them from mere footnote status to a matter of military record.
Chronicling Robert E. Lee's turnabout from defensive maneuvers to full scale Confederate invasion into Maryland, Priest demonstrates how this tactical change brought about a series of engagements near Sharpsburg, Maryland that came to be known as "The Battle of South Mountain" in which the Federal and Confederate forces struggled fiercely over Union territory. It was here that George B. McClellan, the new Northern commander, led his Army of the Potomac to its first victory over Lee in a furious action that produced one of the war's few successful bayonet charges. Written from the perspective of the front line combatants (and civilian observers), the book recounts the Confederate invasion and the Federal pursuit into Sharpsburg that set the stage for Antietam. From September 5-15, a total of twenty-five skirmishes and three pitched battles were fought.
Priest provides graphic descriptions of the terrible conditions surrounding these events and so thoroughly enters into the common soldier's viewpoint that military history quickly gives way to gritty realism. He vividly shows that, had Robert E. Lee not been bested at the gaps along South Mountain, there would have been no Antietam. Lee's decision to make a stand along Antietam Creek was a point of pride--he had never been "whipped" before and would not return to Virginia defeated. That decision was a fateful one, since the sparring and fighting drove him into an untenable position that became his downfall. Priest's revealing narrative establishes that, at this stage of the Civil War, the Federal cavalry was better equipped and just as well trained as the Confederate cavalry thereby settling a point of debate among historians.
Scholars and Civil War buffs alike will applaud the efforts of John Michael Priest in bringing us the means to view those devastating encounters from a true military perspective.?

South Mountain , MD Civil War

As for a narrative on the classic main battle of Antietam; I turn once again to the great Elmo! - ES Watson - 


Antietam or Sharpsburg - By Elmo Scott Watson
- Pueblo Indicator - Sep 18, 1937

printable pdfs at

Iron County Record 1937-09-16 "Antietam" or "Sharpsburg" [best]

Manti Messenger 1937-09-17 "Antietam" or "Sharpsburg"


Our family connection:

Andreas (Andrew) Grimm, 18 years old, sailed on the Harle in 1736 from Rotterdam, Holland via Cowes, landing in Philadelphia, PA on Sept. 1, 1736.  On the Harle, there were 156 men, 65 women, and 167 children.

I have seen the name spelled "Krim" on one Harle manifest, as well as "Crim," and it may be the spelling of the name Grim as Grimm occurred in later years but with some family members never changing. See lists at:

We have no data to determine if Andreas served as an indentured servant or worked for an older brother between 1736-1747 - when his first child (Andrew Jr.) may have been born. It is likely he spent time, however, in Bucks County, PA amongst his many Palatinate brethren. 

Andrew Grim served in the French and Indian War in 1758. His name appears on Captain John White's muster roll as Corp. Andrew Grim - 30 days. 

According to the Scharf's "History of Western Maryland," on page 984, the first land patent issued to Andrew Grim was "The French's Vineyard," on Dec 10, 1759 for 940 acres. [correction from 1752]  

The French's Vineyard was resurveyed for Andrew Grim September 29, 1761. No error was found in the survey but 890 contiguous acres were added. (Land Office at Annapolis, Maryland.) 

On page 985 of Scharf's History lists Andrew Grim with 510 acres from the resurvey of part of Park's Hall, on July 28, 1766. (Washington County Historical Society, Washington County, Maryland.)

History of western Maryland. Being a history of Frederick, Montgomery, Carroll, Washington, Allegany, and Garrett counties from the earliest period to the present day; including biographical sketches of their representative men (1882), Scharf, J. Thomas (John Thomas)


map of Andreas (Andrew) Grim's land - #192 - The French's Vineyard - Washington County, MD 


terrain and satellite views from Parks Hall north to general area estimated to encompass the "French's Vineyard" location, NE of Beaver and Black Rock Creeks

Andrew Grim had communion on April 8, 1762 at Antietam Furnace Lutheran Church in Frederick Co., MD and he was naturalized April 14, 1762.  (Info from Luther Grimm's book.) 

"On August 26, 1767, Samuel Rohrer purchased a 122.5 acre tract from Andrew Grim for 5 Pounds Sterling. It was adjacent to Samuel's Rohrersville property. The parcel was named Rohrer's Luck, and as part of the Resurvey on part of Park Hall.  Park Hall was the oldest of the original surveys in Washington County, occupying several thousand acres generally located between Rohrersville Road (Maryland Rt. 67) and South Mountain. The present day area is still known as Park Hall."
Deed recorded 1767, Liber L p. 35, Frederick County Courthouse, Frederick, MD. - from Michael L. Rohrer website

Andrew Grim was paid three pounds on Saturday, June 6, 1778, for supporting General Washington and the cause during the Revolutionary War.  Source: A letter to George Washington from Henry Laurens, Esg. 

On December 28, 1799, Andrew Grim Jr. bought from his father, Andrew Sr., for ? lbs. cash a part of Parks Hall, and a part of Strife. On October 24, 1809, he sold a grant of land called Mt. Atlas, which was a part of Strife, to Jacob Huffer, a tanner and farmer who was the father of Sarah Huffer, the wife of Rev. Joseph S. Grim." (Source: A Grim/Grimm family descendant) 

The below document, found today, provides references to Andrew Grimm Senior's Park Hall, Strife, and Vineyard purchases, as well as, revealed that Alexander Grim (born 1726), most probably his younger brother, was living nearby [Grim's Fancy, Grim's Delight purchases contiguous to area Mt Atlas]. This serendipitous find yielded not only this relationship, but a long sought for confirmation that Johann Daniel Grimm, of the Rheinland Pfalz, was his father!:

THE LAND TRACTS the Battlefield of South Mountain
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat
The Battle of South Mountain, Md....... Next to Mt. Atlas. Wash. Co. near

Andreas died in 1801, leaving a wife, Margaret, five sons and four daughters...he left the following in his will for his youngest son, Peter, my 4th great-grandfather, as follows :

"...fifteen pounds hard money...Also, I will that Peter Grim have the old place that he lives on clear of rent for the term of two years after my decease, and after the two years is past all my lands to be sold to the highest bidder...Adam Keplinger and Peter Grim Executors" - Will probated May 2, 1801

Peter moved to Saltlick township, Fayette County, Pennsylvania sometime between 1803, when his rent free status ended, and 1807, when he first appeared on the Fayette County tax rolls. Brothers Andrew, Daniel, and Martin - with their wives and most of their younger children, migrated to Ohio;widow Margaret also went with these sons.  Only the John and Mary Fronk? Grimm family stayed en-mass in the Rohrersville, Washington County MD area.

A century later would witness the bloodiest battle of the Civil War commence in the mountain passes, on adjacent fields and along the banks of  bloody Antietam Creek.  Roughly a dozen direct male descendants of Peter's line (7 sons) are known to have served in that bloody war, including my 2nd great-grandfather Henry C. Grimm.  I would not be surprised to discover that at least one of the descendants of Andrew's 5 sons - who thereafter multiplied accordingly (avg 5 sons) - was there in uniform - see 

Roster of Civil War Soldiers from Washington County, Maryland, Revised Edition, Roger Keller, 1993, 1998. Softcover, 5-1/2x8-1/2, 249 pages, as new, compiled in alphabetical order.

and, including females, principally from John Grim's line, they were undoubtedly living nearby as civilians....and most I reckon were also: 

Too Afraid to Cry: Maryland Civilians in the Antietam Campaign, by Kathleen A. Ernst, Stackpole Books, Mar 1, 2007 - 300 pages
"The battle at Antietam Creek, the bloodiest day of the American Civil War, left more than 23,000 men dead, wounded, or missing. Facing the aftermath were the men, women, and children living in the village of Sharpsburg and on surrounding farms. In Too Afraid to Cry, Kathleen Ernst recounts the dramatic experiences of these Maryland citizens--stories that have never been told--and also examines the complex political web holding together Unionists and Secessionists, many of whom lived under the same roofs in this divided countryside."

From Ernst's website:

"Historians identify the battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), which unfolded on September 17, 1862, as “the bloodiest day in American History.” By best counts, more than 23,000 men were dead, wounded, or missing by nightfall. And left in the smoldering aftermath were the children, women, and men who made their homes in the village of Sharpsburg and on surrounding farms.

The military conflict that took place in western Maryland is a critical chapter in American history. But Civil War history is more than a schematic of armies and tactics. Considering the impact the Civil War had on Maryland, and conversely, Maryland had on the politics of both North and South, surprisingly little has been written about this divided state and her citizens. Too Afraid to Cry weaves together firsthand accounts and fast-paced narrative into a tapestry that accurately portrays the experiences of Unionist and secessionist citizens throughout the 1862 Maryland campaign.

In this crucible of western Maryland, the lines between soldier and civilian, friend and enemy, blurred as they never had before. Families and friendships were ripped apart by politics. Those who wanted only to be left alone were forced to face the reality of war on their very thresholds. Some fled immediately, scraping together what they could as refugees; those who remained often were rewarded with shattered businesses and homes.

The soldiers who participated in the 1862 campaign did so because they had chosen to march to war. The Maryland inhabitants who met them had not made that choice. Some rose to the challenge and demonstrated remarkable courage; others exhibited extraordinary foolishness or greed. Whatever their experiences may have been, their stories—told for the first time in Too Afraid to Cry—are no less important that those of the soldiers who marched through their cornfields, and are essential to a full understanding of the Civil War."

When the Civil War passed this way (blog):




War of 1812_Truth In Regard To _1909

On offer: A sweeping, pointed, and concise summary of the War of 1812:


The editorial in the New York "Evening Post" of June 27th, 1908, denouncing the attempts of the Public Schools' Athletic League and of the National Rifle Association to instruct the boys of the High Schools in shooting with a military rifle, asks the questions,"

Could the use of the rifle have any other effect than to stimulate the reckless use of arms by minors?" and, "What kind of patriotism is that which is to be acquired by going to a range and shooting at dummies?"

This and a number of similar statements in otherwise intelligent periodicals, as well as much of the criticism of certain statesmen of both parties and other influential men on Mr. Roosevelt's anxious desire for four battle ships, and against the recent law of Congress to put the National Guard of the different States into condition for service, and in particular, the persistent refusal of Congress after Congress to en act the military legislation urged by nearly every President, are largely based upon an erroneous idea which exists in respect to American success in the warfare on land during the War of 1812.
While the ordinary American is sufficiently familiar with the details of history to know that disasters frequently overtook our armies during the Revolution in consequence of the unreliability of hasty levies of untrained men, and that nothing substantial was accomplished until the organization of the Continentals (who were really regulars), yet few are aware that these disasters were repeated upon a much larger scale throughout the War of 1812.
On the contrary, more than a majority of our people firmly believe that this war was on land, as well as on sea, a series of "magnificent victories, won by inexperienced American citizen soldiers against superior forces of veteran British regulars." In fact, some fifty years ago there was a popular song which represented, and I think still represents, the sentiments of the people on this subject, the refrain of which was,
"In 1812 we licked them well."
This erroneous idea has been strengthened by the similar idea which exists in respect to our Civil War, a war which the community generally associate with the victorious campaigns of Meade, Sherman, Sheridan and Grant, forgetting that they occurred at a period when the "mob of volunteers" of 1861 had been hammered into an army by years of actual conflict, at an enormous and largely unnecessary sacrifice of men and money, and ignoring the disasters and fiascos of 1861 and 1862.
The conviction as to our exploits in 1812 in "defeating foreign regulars with untrained American citizens," is not only prevalent, but constitutes a serious injury to the country in the influence which it exerts in preventing necessary military legislation to provide adequate means of national defence, and at present in lead ing many to oppose that instruction of our youth in marksmanship, not to mention military drill, which every soldier recognizes to be indispensable for the maintenance of the peace; for no country can expect to remain at peace unless it is prepared to defend it self in time of war. As we never will have a sufficient regular army to do this, we can only make up for it by training our youth to be such good shots that they will be formidable as volunteers. The Boer war showed what skilled riflemen could do even against regular soldiers.
It would seem to be timely, therefore, that some attempt at least should be made to state the truth in regard to the land campaigns of the War of 1812, the more so as many of the errors which occurred in them were not only repeated during both the Civil and Spanish wars, but there is every reason to believe will again appear in the next war in which this country may become involved?particularly the enormous loss of life which is certain to result in such a war from our insisting on limiting the medical service of the army in time of peace to one-third of what is required, with no provision for its expansion if war should come. This truth is that, while the work done by our little navy in the War of 1812 was a credit to it and to the country, the campaigns on land were a series of humiliating disasters, with the exception of the Battle of Lundy's Lane, Croghan's defence of Fort Stephenson, the victory of New Orleans, the Battle of the Thames and Jackson's defeat of the Indians.

This arose from the following causes:
1. The Government had made no preparation for the war prior to declaring it.
2. After war had been declared, instead of enlisting troops for a term of years sufficient to ensure their becoming instructed and disciplined, the Government and the States put their main trust in the militia. This, it is fair to say, was not the present uniformed and drilled National Guard, but the "people at large,"
a totally unorganized body without military training, drafts from which were called into service usually for periods of from one to three months?too short a period to train men for effective service. It was, however, as much of a military body as the volunteers we should have to depend upon at the present time in case of war, outside our small regular army and the 115,000 National Guard of the States (assuming that the latter would all respond? a thing that it is impossible to expect). Its members could certainly shoot better than our volunteers would do under existing conditions, as our Spanish war demonstrated that the latter can not shoot at all.
3. The officers, both of the army and the militia, were with out military knowledge, and were usually appointed for political reasons.
4. The leading commanders who were not thus appointed were soldiers of the Revolution, who had become inefficient through age.
It is unnecessary to say that in consequence, in addition to the series of defeats which marked this war, it was prolonged very much beyond the time it should have lasted, and its pecuniary cost was rendered enormous.
These statements are so different from the idea generally entertained on the subject that they will be doubted by many. To establish their truth the following synopsis of the land campaigns in the war is given. It is taken from the "Military Policy of the United States/' compiled by the late Major-General Emory
Upton, a most distinguished soldier of the Civil War, who left it upon his death as a legacy to his country. It was published by the Secretary of War at the request of General William T. Sherman, who read and approved of it. It was republished by the War Department in 1907. All the facts contained in it are therefore officially vouched for.

The Forces Engaged.
War was declared on June 18th, 1812. At this time the British regular troops in Canada were less than 4,500 effectives. Even these were old men or invalids, fit only for garrison duty, as Great Britain had removed all her efficient troops to participate in the Napoleonic campaigns. Those left, however, were disciplined troops commanded by experienced officers. Although six months previously Congress had increased, on paper, the United States regular army to 35,000 men, at the time war was declared it was actually 6,744 strong. This army was poorly officered there being at that time only seventy-one cadets who had graduated from West Point. There were no staff organizations, depots or supplies, nor, in fact, any real military organization. Many of the higher officers who had served with credit in the Revolution were now old men whose energy and initiative had gone.
Notwithstanding the teachings of Washington and Hamilton, Jefferson and his successors in the Presidency, as well as Congress, had become imbued with the idea that a regular army would be a menace to the liberty of the Eepublic, and that the militia could be depended upon for its defence.
The greatest number of British soldiers ever in this country at one time during the war was 16,500 in 1814. In other words, while the population of the United States in 1812 was more than double that of the Colonies in 1775 and its wealth much greater proportionately, the largest number of British troops employed against it at any time in this war was only a little more than a third of those unsuccessfully used by the British in the Revolution.
Instead of falling upon the 5,000 British regulars who held Canada in the beginning and crushing them in a single battle, the want of a sufficient organized force caused the war to be prolonged until the American loss in killed and wounded numbered 5,614. The loss from sickness was over six times this number.
It was very heavy among the Southerners who were sent to the Canadian frontier.
The truth in regard to the war of I812.

The number of troops raised by the United States during this war was:
Regulars (including sailors). 56,032
Volunteers. _ 10,110
Rangers. 3,049
Militia. 456,463
Total 525,654
These figures, however, give no true representation of the actual force in the field at any time, as over 400,000 of these were enlisted for three months or less. With the slow transport of those days, by the time the men reached their rendezvous and had got a partial organization and a little drill, their time of service was about expiring and they had to be sent home. That this involved an enormous cost is self-evident. That such troops were unreliable as soldiers was proved by what took place.

The following is a brief history of the campaigns:

Campaign of 1812.
As soon as war was declared an outcry was raised everywhere that Canada should be immediately captured. Many attempts were made in this direction from different points, all of which were failures. These should be considered by localities:
In the West.?In July, 1812, General Hull crossed from Detroit to Canada with 1,800 men. Without inflicting any damage, he suddenly retreated to Detroit on August 8th, where he was besieged, and where, on August 16th, without firing a shot, he surrendered his entire force to the British, who had 320 regulars,
400 militia and 600 Indians. We thus lost control of the whole of the Northwest. General Hull had been a tried soldier of the Revolution, and he claimed that his troops were insubordinate.
On October 10th, 4,000 Kentucky mounted militia marched towards the Indian villages on the Wabash; but they became alarmed by a fire on the prairie, and on the fifth day abandoned their General and dispersed to their homes.
General William H. Harrison then organized about 10,000 militia from Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia and Pennsylvania for the same purpose. As soon as he marched, the want of proper supplies and the absence of discipline caused mutiny. After a slight engagement, the Virginia militia refused to obey orders and returned to their camp, which broke up the expedition.

The Niagara Frontier.
On October 12th, 1812 (four months after the war had been declared, a period sufficient for the capture of Canada if we had had any army), General Van Rensselaer fought the Battle of Niagara with 900 regulars and 2,270 militia.
He crossed the river and stormed the batteries. But, for want of proper support, the invading party, after a gallant fight, was driven from the batteries to the river and, being unable to cross, was captured. The total force which crossed did not exceed 1,000 men, and its loss was 250 killed and 700 prisoners. The British force was 1,100?600 regulars and 500 militia and Indians. They lost sixteen killed and sixty-nine wounded. This attack was made by General Van Rensselaer against his judgment, on account of the pressure of his officers and troops, who, however, refused to support him when the clash came.
General Smyth having raised 4,500 militia for a month, on November 28th, 1812, after a flowery proclamation, started to invade Canada, but returned the same afternoon. On December 1st, he crossed again, went a quarter of a mile and returned. His army then disappeared.

The Northern Army.
General Dearborn assembled near Lake Champlain another invading army, numbering 5,737, to capture Montreal. He made an advance as far as LaColle River, captured a block-house and then returned and went into winter quarters (where the troops suffered greatly). Nearly all the 3,000 militia included in the force refused to cross the line.
During the year, we called out 43,187 militia and 15,000 regulars, who, being opposed by 5,200 (counting Canadians, but excluding Indians), accomplished nothing. General Brown of our army estimated the British regulars in Upper Canada to be 1,200.
It is notable tftat at this time the President and his Cabinet had authorized the dismantling of the men-of-war of the Navy to convert them into floating batteries for harbor defence. They were only persuaded from carrying out this plan by protests from Captains Bainbridge and Stewart. The result was a series of glorious naval victories.

Campaign of 1813.
During this year Congress endeavored to raise more regular troops, but found it very difficult to do so, the war being unpopular in many sections.

General Winchester, having taken up General Harrison's abortive attempt to relieve the settlers on the Eiver Raisin, advanced with a force of some 900 men. He was attacked on January 22nd, defeated and captured by a British force of 1,000 men under
Proctor, with a loss of 397 killed, 27 wounded and 522 prisoners.
General Harrison had entrenched himself on the east bank of the Miami at Fort Meigs. He was besieged by Proctor with 983 regulars and militia and 1,200 Indians. Kentucky militia to the number of 1,200 were sent to his support, but in disobedience of orders they attacked the British camp and were routed, only 150 escaping. Fort Meigs, although besieged, was not taken; but our losses were 87 killed, 189 wounded and 605 prisoners. The British lost 14 killed, 47 wounded and 40 prisoners.
On August 2nd the British with 391 regulars attacked Fort Stephenson held by Major Croghan with 160 regulars, but were repulsed with heavy loss. This was a creditable affair for us, particularly as Croghan was not twenty-one.
On September 27th Harrison, having received re-enforcements from Kentucky and Ohio, crossed to Canada and on October 5th attacked Proctor on the Thames and totally defeated him, with a loss of 12 killed, 22 wounded and 600 prisoners, all regulars. It was in this battle that Tecumseh was killed.
Harrison had a force of about 1,300. But instead of being sent forward to take advantage of this victory?which won back the territory we had lost and detached the southwestern Indians from the British cause?his army was disbanded. The militia was discharged and Harrison sent back to Detroit. His success, in contrast to the dreary series of disappointing disasters that had marked the war, justly gave him an enduring reputation.

In the Centre.
In February, 1813, the British force in this section was estimated at 2,100 by the Secretary of War.
On April 27th General Dearborn advanced on York (now Toronto) and captured it, the American forces being 1,700 and the British 750 regulars and militia and 100 Indians. We lost 270, mostly by a mine explosion. The British loss was 200 killed and wounded and 293 prisoners. Dearborn took Fort George on May 27th, and later the other forts on the Niagara frontier.
In one of the attacks an American force of 542 men, mostly regulars, was, however, surrendered because its Colonel believed he was surrounded!
A British attack, on May 27th, on Saekett's Harbor was repulsed with heavy loss by the regulars after a creditable fight.
This, like all previous engagements, showed the value of disciplined troops, as the militia ran away after firing one volley.
The fugitives who fled in panic to Kingston reported that the battle had been lost, which caused the burning of the naval barracks and stores; a serious loss.

The Failure of the Attack on Montreal.
To attack Montreal 8,000 regulars, under General Wilkinson, rendezvoused, at the foot of Lake Ontario, to descend the St. Lawrence, while another army about 5,000 strong, under General Hampton, was assembled at the foot of Lake Champlain. Though called "regulars," these were recruits without discipline or competent officers.
Hampton crossed the frontier, but was repulsed by a force of 800 militia and Indians, and he returned to Lake Champlain on November 11th. Wilkinson's advance of 1,600 men met 800 British regulars at Chrystler's Fields, whence, after a fight of about two hours, in which he lost 338 killed and wounded, our forces returned to their boats. A council of war then decided that the attack on Montreal should be abandoned and the army go into winter quarters on the American shore. Thus 13,000 men were beaten back by a force of regulars, militia and Indians not exceeding 2,000.

The Centre.
The British then threatened Fort George, the defence of which had been left to General McClure, who sum moned a council of war, which decided that the fort was not tenable. Thereupon it was evacuated, and the force returned to the American shore, General McClure directing that the village of Newark be burned.
The British crossed the river on December 19th, captured Fort Niagara through the criminal negligence of the commander, and, in retaliation for the burning of Newark, destroyed Lewiston, Buffalo and several other towns. The inhabitants of Western New York fled, some of them as far east as the Genesee River. General Cass wrote on January 12th, 1814, in regard to the destruction of Buffalo: "I am satisfied that not more than 650 men, of regulars, militia and Indians, landed at Black Bock. To oppose these we had from 2,500 to 3,000 militia. All, except very few of them, behaved in the most cowardly manner. They fled without discharging a musket."

The Chesapeake Bay.
On March 4th, 1813, the British fleet entered the Chesapeake, and between April 20th and May 6th it
captured and burned Frenchtown, Havre-de-Grace, Georgetown and Fredericktown. The landing party in each of these cases was composed of about 150 marines and a small detachment of artillery. On June 20th the British attacked Craney Island in the hope of taking Norfolk and its navy-yard, but they were repulsed.
On the 25th the British took and destroyed Hampton. Their forces consisted of 2,000 men; their loss was 48. The Americans had 450 militia, who lost 31. This, therefore, was a creditable performance by the Americans.

The Creek War.
On August 30th, 1813, the Creek Indians captured Fort Mims in Southern Alabama and massacred all in it, some 400. General Jackson was given command of 2,500 men raised by Tennessee. On November 3rd he fought the Battle of Tallasahatchee, and on November 9th crushed the Creeks in a second engagement. For want of supplies, however, due largely to the failure of the Government to organize properly the staff departments until hostilities had become imminent, Jackson was compelled to lead his troops back to Fort Strother. The militia resolved to go home, but they were stopped by the volunteers.
Shortly thereafter the volunteers decided to imitate their example, but were stopped by the militia. Jackson then agreed that, if the supplies did not arrive in two days, they would all march back. When the time was up fulfillment of the promise was demanded, but the General said that, if only two men would remain with him, he would never abandon the post. One hundred and nine responded and were left as garrison, and Jackson started back with the remainder upon the understanding that if the expected supplies were met the troops would return. Twelve miles from the fort they met the supplies (cattle), but the troops refused to obey the order to return. They were compelled to do so by Jackson, however, who seized a musket and barred the home ward road of the mutineers. This ended the glorious record of 1813. During the year we were expelled from Canada and our villages on the northern frontier were destroyed.

Campaign of 1814.
At the expiration of their terms of enlistment Jackson's soldiers left him and were replaced by new levies, so that it was not until the 6th of February, 1814 (a loss of six months), that he found himself at the head of an army of 5,000 men. With 3,000 of these he attacked the Indians at Horse Shoe Bend on March 27th, 1814, and destroyed them.
In 1814 Congress, for the first time, showed common sense by extending the term of enlistment in the army to five years.
But while it offered a bounty, the amount was less than the States were offering to substitutes, and it was therefore difficult to recruit the regulars. The increase in bounties, as was shown during the Revolution and also during the Civil War, led to desertions.
The regulars during the winter and spring of 1814 were much improved, commanders like Scott and Brown personally teaching their officers the elements of drill so that they might instruct their men. The old incompetents, like Wilkinson and Hampton, were displaced.
In July our army crossed the Niagara; took Fort Erie; gained the victory of Chippewa; fought the drawn battle of Lundy's Lane; fell back on Fort Erie, where it was invested; raised the siege by a successful sortie, and returned to the American shore after demolishing the fort. Although the invasion was a failure, the conduct of the army was entitled to the highest praise.
At the Battle of Lundy's Lane the British force was 5,000; the American, 3,000. The British lost 878; the American regulars, killed and wounded, 691; the volunteers, 57; a total of 748.
This was about the first occasion during the war when the American troops put up a square obstinate fight in the open against the British regulars. While both sides retreated after the engagement, in view of the difference in strength the engagement is regarded as an American success.

On the Northern Frontier.
On March 30th, 1814, Wilkinson, with nearly 4,000 regulars, invaded Canada, but was checked by
180 men stationed in a stone mill; and, after sustaining a loss of 154, he retreated to Plattsburg and then retired from the army.
In August, the British were preparing to advance up Lake Champlain and Plattsburg was threatened. In spite of this, by orders from the Secretary of War, General Izard's force of 4,000 men on August 29th marched from Plattsburg, where their presence was indispensable, to Sacketf s Harbor, where there was nothing requiring their presence.
On September 11th the Governor-General of Canada at the head of 11,000 British veterans, who had arrived during the summer, mostly from the Spanish Peninsula, attacked Plattsburg, but the total destruction of his fleet by Commodore McDonough broke his line of communications and compelled him to return to Canada.
The depleted American force in Plattsburg was then 3,500. The only thing that saved it, and, in fact, saved New York from the invasion of the British forces was the success of the navy. It is noticeable that on this occasion, when the cannonading was distinctly audible at Burlington, Vermont, Governor Chittenden, of that State, refused aid to the American forces upon the ground that he had no authority to order the militia to leave the State. A number of the Vermont militia crossed and participated in the fight at Plattsburg in spite of his opposition.

The Capture of Washington.
Although the British fleet, with about 3,000 troops on board, had been hovering along the shores
of the Chesapeake for nearly a year nothing was done to protect Washington until the beginning of the summer of 1814. The Secretary of State then ascertained that the regulars in Maryland and Virginia were but 2,208, composed largely of recruits, who were dispersed at various points from Baltimore to Norfolk. This situation was presented to the Cabinet on June 7th, but no action was suggested.
On July 2nd tbe Tenth Military District was created, comprising Maryland, the District of Columbia and a part of Virginia. The command of this district was given to General Winder, not because he was distinguished professionally, but because he was a native of Maryland and a relative of the Governor and "thus would be useful in mitigating the opposition to the war in other words, for his political influence.
On July 4th the Governors of States were requested to hold in readiness for immediate service 93,500 men. It was considered too expensive to actually call them out!
General Winder, who had but 700 or 800 regulars, asked that 4,000 militia should be called out and stationed to protect Washington. Finally, on August 13th, after he had been authorized to make a call for 15,000 men and had done so, the militia who responded were mustered on August 21st. This army was 5,401, of whom 400 were regulars, 600 marines, 20 sailors, the remainder being volunteers and militia. Its commander says it was "suddenly assembled without organization or discipline, or officers of the least knowledge of service." On August 24th, three days after its muster, it was attacked by an advance division of 1,500 men out of a British force of 3,500, and was routed with a total loss of but 8 killed and 11 wounded!
It is noticeable that the men who participated in this panic, as well as those who were involved in the other humiliating disasters mentioned in this article, were in all respects, except discipline and competent officers (two vital exceptions), the same as those who fought in the Battle of Lundy's Lane, and there, out of 3,000 men, 76 officers were killed or wounded and 629 rank and file, and they" held at bay in the open field 5,000 British regular troops."
Atter the "Bladensburg Races," the British continued their march, captured Washington, burned the White House, the Treasury and the War Offices, and the next day returned unmolested to their shipping.
This scandalous disaster was largely due to the cheese-paring economy of Congress and the President, who refrained from calling out the militia for drill and organization until the time when they were required to fight without them. It resulted, however, in driving from office the Secretary of War, who had undertaken to manage the war himself and to give direct orders to the different commands.
On September 13th the British made a combined land and naval attack on Baltimore, but were driven back with a loss of 319.
During 1814 we called out 38,186 regulars, 197,653 militia, a total of 235,839, against 16,500 British. The utmost strength we could show in the shape of an effective force in battle was 3,000 at Lundy's Lane.

Campaign of 1815.
The only engagement of this campaign was the victory of New Orleans, which was won on January 8th, two weeks after the conclusion of the treaty of peace. The British had a force of 14,250 regulars, veterans just sent from England; General Jackson had 5,698 volunteers. The actual attack was a frontal one, made by the British with 8,000 men against strong entrenchments; the British lost 2,100 killed and wounded and 500 prisoners; the Americans 7 killed and 6 wounded. This result was largely due to the indomitable energy of General Jackson, and the remainder to the wonderful marksmanship of his Kentucky and Tennessee troops, most of whom, it must be remembered, had acquired considerable military experience in the warfare against the Creeks.
As Henry Clay, however, said, "It wound up a disastrous and humiliating war in a blaze of glory I" This gave General Jackson a popularity among the masses, which, as was said at the time, would stand anything." Although there were many who, during his stormy career, differed with him upon political questions, the number of those who could be induced by such differences to vote against "the hero of New Orleans " were few.

The Financial Loss.
The expenses of the War Department during these three years of futile war were $82,627,509.44, which was more than twice what had been spent upon the Army during the twenty-five years preceding 1812. Those of the Navy were $30,286,534.44. The pension bill up to 1903 was $45,186,197, although the people felt so sore over the results that it was not until 1871 that a pension law was passed affecting the soldiers of this war, except those that were disabled. General Upton figures the total cost of this war to have been $198,000,000, excluding pensions.
If Congress had applied a small part of this sum from 1808 to 1811 to maintaining an army of 15,000, capable of being expanded, Canada would have been ours and the war would have been ended in a single campaign. The loss sustained from the failure to acquire Canada is incalculable. In view of this humiliating record, can any lover of his country or any man of common sense question the wisdom of Messrs. Root and Taft, or of Mr. Roosevelt, not to mention the Public Schools' Athletic League and the National Rifle Association, in endeavoring in time of peace to prepare the United States for defence in time of war, or continue to entertain the idea that numbers of untrained men, without skill in marksmanship, make an army, or can defend the country against a small force of well-disciplined and well-officered foreign regulars?

- George W. Wingate.

[Or terrorists and nutcases - foreign or domestic!]
The Truth in Regard to the War of 1812 and the Necessity of Our Knowing It
Author(s): George W. Wingate Reviewed work(s):Source: The North American Review, Vol. 189, No. 643 (Jun., 1909), pp. 831-843  Published by: University of Northern Iowa
Stable URL: . Accessed: 13/09/2012


When War Came to the United States - By Elmo Scott Watson
- The Clinton County Times - Dec 14, 1944 [note sidebar article on Indian code talkers!]

pdfs for printing:
Garfield County News 1944-12-07 When War Came to the United States
Kane County Standard 1944-12-08 When War Came to the United States
Manti Messenger 1944-12-08 When War Came to the United States
Rich County 1944-12-08 When War Came to the United States

A recently discovered and informative blog:

The Commonplace Book: Notes and images from the Old Northwest of past and present.

The American Army of 1812 and the School of Discipline

US Army Rangers: a Forgotten Unit of the War of 1812

For a compelling view of the War of 1812 as "the last battle of the Long War for the West"...which resolved "the great problem of North American, and perhaps even Atlantic, history from 1754 to 1815: the fate of the trans-Appalachian West."; see:

The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History
Author(s): By Fran├žois Furstenberg
The American Historical Review, Vol. 113, No. 3 (June 2008), pp. 647-677
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical Association

"...As for the historiography on the early United States, most of it focuses on the East, with the West treated as something of a sideshow, destined to form part of the expanding nation. The newer historiography on the Atlantic world, which aims to transcend the limits imposed by national historiographies, would seem to offer some hope. So far, however, it has tended to remain content sailing aboard ships or landing along coastlines, leaving the more grueling trek into continental interiors to the national historiographies it so haughtily claims to supersede."..."If the United States and Great Britain fought a war in the East and on the Atlantic over questions of maritime rights and impressment, American settlers and Native Americans in the Mississippi Valley fought a far more consequential war whose objectives were, on the one side, continued U.S. expansion into Native and British land, and, on the other, the preservation of the West as an Indian country forever protected from American settlement. If this seems familiar, that is because these objectives echoed those for which France had gone to war in 1754, for which Pontiac had fought in 1763, and which the British had pursued since 1783: the restriction of American settlement from the trans-Appalachian West, and the creation of a buffer between the United States and British and Spanish territory. Like previous wars, the War of 1812 saw the emergence of pan-Indian unity and ideology: where in the past it had been led by Neolin and Pontiac, now it was led by the Shawnee leader Tecumseh and his brother Tenskwatawa. As previous wars had seen Native leaders urging a return of the French to counterbalance British power, this war saw Native leaders in the North and Southwest reach out to the British and Spanish to balance U.S. power."

...and beyond the War of 1812: 

The American Military on the Frontier: Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium, edited by James P. Tate. Office of Air Force History, 1976, pp. 174-175


Pre-Civil War Period
"I was struck-as were Professors Ropp and Coles-with the heavy emphasis on the post-Civil War period, the mere 25 years from 1865 to 1890. It was almost as though the “army on the frontier” were equated with the “Indian fighting army” of the plains and mountains.
Had the symposium speakers, I wondered, been captured by the romantic, popular-I was almost tempted to say Hollywood concept of the west? If we are to look at the truly significant military influence of the army on the frontier, should we not turn our attention instead, as Professor Ropp has suggested, to the earlier decades in American history? Should we not turn to the 75 years between the Revolution and the Civil War, a period when the frontier was proportionately more important in the total national picture, when the Indian nations still exercised large elements of sovereignty and for a considerable time could expect succor from foreign powers, and when the army’s role was not fighting Indians and protecting settlers but vindicating United States authority in the west, a role of paramount importance.
Let me expand just a bit on this last point. The United States was granted the land up to the Mississippi at the end of the Revolutionary War, but it was necessary to exert authority if the territory was indeed to be American-exert authority against British-Indian encroachment in the northwest (with their living dream of an Indian buffer state between the Ohio and the Great Lakes) anp against Spanish pretensions in the south, to say nothing of the vague French schemes for recapturing the Mississippi Valley that so disturbed Alexander Hamilton in the late 1790s. And after 1803 there was the vast Louisiana Purchase, its boundaries unclear and its contents unknown, to be brought effectively under American control. We need to recall that Pike’s explorations and the Lewis and Clark expedition, were army enterprises.
Equally worth remarking were the visionary plans of Secretary of War John C. Calhoun after the War of 1812 to establish American presence in the west. It was the frontier army that was the national instrument in this great task-building a cordon of military posts along the Great Lakes and the western rivers, to make clear to the British and to the Indians that United States sovereignty in fact extended over the land it claimed.
The army was the chief agent in the exuberant nationalism that marked the post-1815 years, a nationalism strikingly exhibited in Calhoun’s directions to [Brevet] General Thomas A. Smith [Colonel Commanding The Rifle Regiment] in 1818, for establishing a military post at the mouth of the Yellowstone River on the upper reaches of the Missouri. Calhoun admitted that the remoteness of the post would make it unpleasant for the soldiers. But he wrote: 
“I am persuaded that the American soldier, actuated by the spirit of enterprise, will meet the privations which may be necessary with cheerfulness. Combined with the importance of the service, the glory of planting the American flag at a point so distant, on so noble a river, will not be unfelt. The world will behold in it the mighty growth of our republic, which but a few years since, was limited by the Alleghany; but now is ready to push its civilization and laws to the western confines of the continent.”...." 


American Indian Day features by ES Watson

"What started at the turn of the century as an effort to gain a day of recognition for the significant contributions the first Americans made to the establishment and growth of the U.S., has resulted in a whole month being designated for that purpose...Several states celebrate the fourth Friday in September. In Illinois, for example, legislators enacted such a day in 1919. Read more: American Indian Heritage Month Origins —

Born in Illinois and a resident of that state for most of his life, in the course of his long feature writing career, a number of Indian-Day inspired articles were published in the month September.

Indeed, as concerns the Native American influence, as a frontier historian journalist, Watson cut his early historical feature writing teeth by penning his first short vignette series entitled - Stories of Great Scouts and Great Indians

For the story behind the story of this series [discussed below] see Miranda Brady's singular research article, "Stories of Great Indians” by Elmo Scott Watson: Syndication, Standardization, and the Noble Savage in Feature Writing

also published in American Indians and the Mass Media, Chapter 2, "Stories of Great Indians" by Elmo Scott Watson: Syndication, Standardization and the Noble Savage in Feature Writing, by Miranda J. Brady,
Meta G. Carstarphen, John P. Sanchez
University of Oklahoma Press, Oct 1, 2012

(In Tales of the Old Frontier, Indians would, of course, similarly play their appropriate prominent role in the adventures described.)

The following Utah Digital Newspaper links provide the gateway to readable and printable pdfs of the following ES Watson features selected from his old September targated observances of American Indian Day:

Sitting Bull
Garfield County 1927-09-16 Tatanka Yotanka
Iron County Record 1927-09-09 Tatanka Yotanka
Piute County 1927-09-16 Tatanka Yotanka

Iron County Record 1929-09-04 Memorials to a Vanished Race
Millard County Progress 1929-09-06 Memorials to a Vanished Race
Murray Eagle 1929-09-05 Memorials to a Vanished Race

Crazy Horse
Davis County Clipper 1934-09-07 Crazy Horse, Fighting Chief of the Sioux
Iron County Record 1934-09-06 Crazy Horse, Fighting Chief of the Sioux
Parowan Times 1934-09-07 Crazy Horse, Fighting Chief of the Sioux
San Juan Record 1934-09-06 Crazy Horse, Fighting Chief of the Sioux
Times Independent 1934-09-06 Crazy Horse,Fighting Chief of the Sioux

Manti Messenger 1936-09-04 Geronimo Surrenders!" - Our Indian Wars End
Parowan Times 1936-09-04 "Geronimo Surrenders!"-Our Indian Wars End

Red Cloud
Iron County Record 1937-09-23 Red Cloud, Chief of the Oglala Sioux. Was a Warrior, Patriot and Diplomat
The Roosevelt Standard 1937-10-07 Red Cloud, Cheif of the Oglala Sioux, Was a Warrior, Patriot and Diplomat

Bonus feature looking towards Fall - my favorite time of the year:

Indian Summer
Kane County Standard 1929-10-25 Indian Summer
Parowan Times 1929-10-23 Indian Summer
Piute County 1929-10-25 Indian Summer [best copy]
Rich County 1929-10-18 Indian Summer

Memorials to a Vanished Race
Kane County Standard 1929-09-13 Memorials to a Vanished Race
Millard County Progress 1929-09-06 Memorials to a Vanished Race
Murray Eagle 1929-09-05 Memorials to a Vanished Race


 "Stories of Great Indians” by Elmo Scott Watson: Syndication, Standardization, and the Noble Savage in Feature Writing, by Miranda Brady

Quoting her abstract verbatim::   "This paper explores the career and work of journalist Elmo Scott Watson, describing the role of his syndicated feature stories in standardizing discourses about American Indian people in the popular press of the early twentieth century. Situating Watson’s work against the backdrop of professionalized news, I argue that it was not merely the emerging technologies which led to the reproduction of the noble and ignoble savage binary in the popular press, but the “internal logics” of such discursive formations which made them so easily reproduced. In addition, I suggest that while scholars have focused a great deal of attention on hard news stories and the ideal of objectivity, we can learn more by exploring the productivity of “entertaining” newspaper content such as Watson’s stories. Watson was an agent in reproducing the standards of his discipline, and looking to his work can tell us a great deal about the exigency of his field as journalism was becoming professionalized. I argue that while Watson’s stories were considered entertaining, he and others in his field believed such content served an important educational function; in particular, Watson believed he was correcting negative misconceptions about American Indian people through the noble savage identity construct." [Watson, “The Last Indian  War, 1890-91--A Study of Newspaper Jingoism."]

Moreover, Ms. Brady later reveals that, while promotional literature stated "“The Indian has been the author’s hobby,” more tellingly about Watson, "It is clear from his interest in American Indian issues and his criticism of the United States government and journalists for inciting the violence at Wounded Knee he felt empathy for  American Indian people and wished to dispel what he perceived as unfair stereotypes about them...he argued that newspaper coverage had facilitated the slaughter of Indian men, women, and children at Wounded Knee in 1890,..."

 "Along with many others of his generation, Elmo Scott Watson seemed to long for the unexplored frontier." she tells us and Watson "...desperately attempted to record those great achievements of American Indian individuals before they were forgotten." Through Brady we learn that Watson once opined -  “Some day, perhaps, he [the American Indian hero] will get justice—not justice in the restoration  of his land which most of us admit we stole from him and did it pretty crudely, but justice in  what we say about him”. He continues, "Perhaps, then, there won’t be so much in our school histories about some of the blundering generals of the Civil War and more about Crazy Horse and Gall, Cornstalk  and Little Turtle. We may even put Black Hawk, Osceola, King Phillip, Tecumseh and  Captain Jack under the classification of patriots along with some of the Revolutionary  statesmen and soldiers."

Brady then informs us that in Great Stories of Indians..."Watson often combined this identity construct with other popular narratives such as Greco/Roman epidictic speech and biblical stories. For example, he writes,  “About the best we can do in estimating the Indian is to take him just as he was, a pretty fine sort  of savage man – certainly as good as many of the Homeric Greeks and the Romans – and give  him is place in history” The following example from the series, “Stories of Great Indians” illustrates Watson’s elixir of American Indian characters and well accepted biblical narratives: “The white man’s history records Captain Jack only as a treacherous murderer. Had he been a white man, perhaps it  would have pronounced him a martyr.”*   Demonstrating the noble savage construct, he described Shabbona and Spotted Tail as “friends” of the white man. Sitting Bull became “The Indian Sphinx”. He suggested of  Chief Rain-In-The-Face that he was “a man utterly indifferent to pain, danger or death”.  Sequoyah became the “Cadmus” of the Cherokees, Osceola became the  “Indian Hamlet”, and Chief Joseph was the Xenophon of the Indians.  He referred to Chikchikam Lupalkuelatko as “the Leonidas of the Modocs,” after the Spartan leader.  He called Pontiac the “Indian Napoleon” and  referred to Chief Red Jacket as “Sage of The Senecas”.  In addition to the  stories, series illustrations also exemplified the iconographic Indian. A drawing of an archetypal,  mascot-esc noble savage in headdress adorns the cover of “Stories of Great Indians” series. 13   But at the same time Watson paternalistically imposed these Greeko-Roman and  Christian oriented tales onto Native people, he suggested that his Indian subjects were less developed socially. [Again, see my Stories of Great Scouts and Great Indians also at Selected links to Historical Articles by ES Watson and JD Sherman - 1921-1945

Watson appealed to his more skeptical readers with the following passage:  
"Some readers may think I have played these Indians up too much as heroes, and be  impelled to write to the editor and tell him what they think of the stories and the man who  wrote them. To get a jump on them I will say this……To the old-timer who has seen  Indians on the warpath and witnessed some of their cruelties, who says: “If that young  feller had seen some of the things I’ve seen them red devils do!”…Common fairness  shouldn’t allow us to judge the Indians by our standards.  He was a savage, at just about the stage in civilization the white man was just a few centuries back.  The Apache Indian, usually rated the worst of them all, didn’t have much on the Spanish Inquisition.  About  300 years ago the Puritans were burning witches in the name of religion.  The Germans  are said to have done some beastly things in Belgium....He’s gone now and no amount of railing against the destiny which ruled that the white  man should dominate the red, can bring him back. Sometime the yellow race may do the same to the white and then the law of compensation will have worked out." 

[Watson, Elmo Scott.,  Stories of Great Indians (1922). Western Newspaper Union. Accessed  through the Newberry Library’s Ayer Collection: Elmo Scott Watson Papers, Box 5,   Folder 47.)]
While not trying to argue the validity, merits or moral efficacy of either the noble or ignoble savage construct, or adopt Watson's own Darwinist determinism, or even agree that those Native Americans living today - not gone by a long shot - deserve a better deal... I do hope that by resurrecting these articles, once again Watson's writing will, as Ms. Brady so eloquently assesses, find itself   "...resonating easily with readers, providing them with edutainment to fill their leisure hours.  Elmo Scott Watson was one of the notable feature writers and teachers who helped to establish those longstanding formulas in his profession which would appeal to the reader’s sense  of pleasure while they self-educated."

The dry, politically correct, and always controversial, history found in the textbooks of the now last half century or more, certainly pale [face] in comparison!  
*Stories of Great Indians -  Satank Shows How A Kiowa Chief Can Die - Captain Jack, The Martyr Of The Modocs - By Elmo Scott Watson - Lafayette Ledger - Jun 10, 1922
also later covered in
Historical Highlights - Massacre in Modoc-Land - Gen E.R.S Canby - By Elmo Scott Watson - The Pentwater News, Apr 18, 1941





To find full feature articles on some of these great warriors, search at UDN, or scan by eye or use your browser's "find" feature at Selected links to Historical Articles by ES Watson and JD Sherman - 1921-1945

OK - here's what I culled in order to save you the effort!:

The Red Man Speaks for Himself - By Elmo Scott Watson
Duchesne County Newspapers - Sep 21, 1928

Piute County 1928-03-23 In the Days of Geronimo

Piute County 1928-05-11 Three Famous Indian Mothers

- Providence County Times, Aug 30 and Sep 6, 1929

When Great Tecumseh Fell - Battle of the Thames - Johnson's Kentucky
Mounted Riflemen - By Elmo Scott Watson
- Providence County Times, Sep 13 and Sep 20, 1929

Piute County 1929-09-27 When Great Tecumseh Fell

Piute County 1929-12-06 To Preserve Indian Sign Language 

Osceola - Seminoles - "They Fell Without an Attempt to Retreat" - By
Elmo Scott Watson
- Providence County Times, Dec 27, 1929
- The Pentwater News, Jan 3, 1930

Quannah Parker- Comanche - Joseph-Nez Perce - Honoring Two Great
Chieftains - By Elmo Scott Watson
- The Pentwater News, Oct 3, 1930 (only 1 issue in Oct)

- The Pentwater News, Nov 4, 1932

Who Is the Greatest Indian Today - By Elmo Scott Watson
- Carbon County News, Sep 6, 1933

Piute County 1934-06-29 They Sowed the Seeds of Liberty - Iroquois

"Ending" of Our 100-Year Indian "War"? - Seminoles - Osceola-  By Elmo Scott Watson
- Pueblo Indicator - May 4, 1935

Passing of the Pottawatomies - By Elmo Scott Watson
- Pueblo Indicator - Jul 27, 1935


Iron County Record 1937-06-10 Joseph of the Nez Perces
Parowan Times 1937-06-11 Joseph of the Nez Perces

Joseph of the Nez Perces - By Elmo Scott Watson
- Pueblo Indicator, Jun 12, 1937

"Little Crow has Taken the Warpath!" - By Elmo Scott Watson
- Pueblo Indicator - Aug 14, 1937

Battle of Thames, October 5, 1813, Ended Career of a Great Red Man - Tecumseh - By Elmo Scott
- Pueblo Indicator - Oct 1, 1938

- The Pentwater News, Oct 21, 1938

Iron County Record 1938-09-01 Story of a White Man, a Red Man and "Father of Waters,"

Sitting Bull's Death - Tatanka i-Yotanka - By Elmo Scott Watson
- The Pentwater News, Dec 13, 1940

The Indian of Today - First Class Fighting Man - By Elmo Scott Watson
-The Pentwater News, Jul 2, 1943




Charles Erskine Scott Wood - Nez Perce Campaign - By Elmo Scott Watson
- Pentwater News - Apr 7, 1944

The recent death of Col Charles Erskine Scott Wood in California recalls one of the most dramatic incidents in American military history...
also in
The Clinton County Times - Mar 30, 1944 

for more on the fascinating, wide-ranging life of this talented and accomplished renaissance man see: Erskine_Scott_Wood

Famous Indians, Charles Erskine Scott Wood, The Century Company, 1893

Century Illustrated Monthly 46, July 1893, pp. 436-445

FEW years ago the buffalo stopped the way of the Union Pacific trains, but to-day it is to be found only as a rarity in parks and menageries. The typical North American Indian is nearly as extinct. Judging from my own observation among them, the generation which is now passing away will be the last which will truly exhibit the finer qualities of the natural savage.
It would be foreign to the present subject to discuss the reasons for the decay of the Indian; it is enough to accept the fact that he receives from civilization little or nothing which benefits him. Morals are largely mere customs or habits of thought; the essential morality oflife,which, broadly speaking, is truth and honesty, is known and valued among every people. The Indian always esteemed bravery, virtue, and truth, so I believe he has gained little or nothing from the white civilization,and has lost everything. He has lost the fine flavor of the wilderness, much of the simplicity and integrity of natural life, or " savagery," and has readily absorbed the pleasant vices of civilization. With drunkenness, disease, dependence upon a paternal government which is not paternal, and the annihilation of his environment, it has become as impossible for the Indian to exist as for the buffalo. Therefore, it is thought that the medallions here presented of some of the greatest Indian chiefs, men who are typical of all that was best in the original life of this people, will have great ethnological, as well as artistic, interest, and that the careful modeling of their faces by Mr. Olin L. Warner, an artist conscientiously realistic in his portraiture, yet subtly imaginative in his delineation of character, will prove a work of national importance. The entire expedition, which, as a private enterprise, has preserved these valuable memoranda for the future generations of America, is perhaps worthy of extended comment; but only this will now be said — that the reader may appreciate the rare opportunity which placed such valuable material at his disposal. It was undertaken by Mr. Warner from a love of the subject, and was accomplished without aid from any one, except that he was fortunate in the sympathy of Mr. Edward McNeill, General Superintendent of the Union Pacific Railway, who lent valuable assistance. Indeed, one of the medallions—that of Seltice—was modeled in the car placed at Mr. Warner's disposal, and could not have been obtained in any other way, as Seltice's engagement to be at the camp of some of his people was of far more importance in his eyes than mere dabblings in mud; but he had no objection to the sculptor making what use he pleased of his features during the time he himself was being forwarded on his way. As I am not competent to speak for them, the reproductions of the medallions must speak for themselves; but no reproduction can do justice to the sculpturesque and poetic qualities of the original. Joseph was modeled life-size, the others about one half or two thirds life-size. One of the most noticeable traits of Mr. Warner's subjects was their personal indifference to his work. They obliged him by posing as an act of courtesy or hospitality, but it was evidently a great bore, and when they were notified that the work was done, they quietly walked away without even looking at it. Whether they really saw everything out of the comers of their eyes, as an Indian has a habit of doing, and whether this lack of interest in themselves was affected or not, I cannot say; but I am inclined to think it was genuine, for when they were asked to inspect the medallions and to give an opinion, they did so pleasantly and simply...."

[Indians featured: Joseph - Nez Perce, Encheaskwe, or Vincent, chief of the Coeur d'Alenes, Seltice - Coeur d'Alene, Lot - chief of the Spokanes, Young Chief - Cayuse, Moses, or Sulktash-Kosha (the Half Sun) - chief of the Ilnamehin or Okinokane, Yatiniawitz - chief of the Cayuses, E-He-Gant - chief of the Pi-Utes]

"Joseph came to his surrender as a wintry sun was nearing the horizon. He said:
Tell General Howard I know his heart. What he told me before—I have it in my heart. I am tired of fighting. Our chiefs are killed. Lookingglass is dead. Too-hul-hul-suit is dead. The old men are all dead. It is the young men, now, who say " Yes "or " No." He who led on the young men is dead. It is cold, and we have no blankets. The little children are freezing to death. My people — some of them — have run away to the hills, and have no blankets, no food. No one knows where they are — perhaps freezing to death. I want to have time to look for my children, and to see how many of them I can find; maybe I shall find them among the dead. Hear me, my chiefs, my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now stands I will fight no more forever!

Joseph has only one wife, and his youngest child, a daughter, was born during the heat of the fight in White Bird Canon in 1877. He told me, however, when last I saw him, that his tepee was now empty and he was alone, for all his children were dead. He is a great Indian, a great soldier, and, more than that, he is a great man."...

"Yatiniawitz has been a most valuable ally to the whites since he ceased fighting them, lending his fervid oratory, the poetical fire of which nothing can describe, to an advocacy of peace and friendship. He has engaged in their service against other Indians upon every occasion, and, as the record on his medallion recites, has been three times wounded in their behalf. His eye has in it something of the expression seen in Joseph's, the studied calm and quiet reserve, the contented consciousness of force, sometimes noticed in the eye of a lion; but with Yatiniawitz there is also in the restless movements of the eye a suggestion of the hawk. Tall, lean, and wiry, he deserves his name of " Poor Crane." He is truly the embodiment of the wilderness, a creation of nature, and it would be as impossible for him to cultivate the lands allotted to him in severalty, as Young Chief is doing, as it would be for a cougar to turn sheep-dog. He still keeps to the simple wants of the savage, still lives as he has always lived, accepting the good and evil of his life with fortitude, and above all things insists that a man needs only two virtues—bravery and truth." C. E. S. Wood. 

A book of tales: being some myths of the North American Indians
Charles Erskine Scott Wood, The Vanguard press, 1929

Re-imagining the Indian: Charles Erskine Scott Wood and Frank Linderman, by Sherry L. Smith
The Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 3, Power and Place in the North American West (Summer, 1996), pp. 149-158

From the Halls of Montezuma
Montezuma: Warlord of the Aztecs by Peter G. Tsouras; The Indian Chief as Tragic Hero: Native Resistance and the Literatures of America, from Moctezuma to Tecumseh by Gordon M. Sayre; The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820-1875 by Gary Clayton Anderson; From Dominance to Disappearance: The Indians of Texas and the Near Southwest, 1786-1859 by F. Todd Smith; Morning Star Dawn: The Powder River Expedition and the Northern Cheyennes, 1876 by Jerome A. Greene; The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke, Volume Two, July 29, 1876-April 7, 1878 by Charles M. Robinson,; Lt. Charles Gatewood and His Apache Wars Memoir by Charles B. Gatewood; Louis Kraft
Review by: Bruce VandervortThe Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 2007), pp. 505-511